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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the drivers behind two significant U.S. policy changes 
regarding geopolitical issues in the South China Sea. The first policy change was the 
gradual shift from neutrality to an anti-China stance on the various territorial and 
maritime claims in the South China Sea. The second change was the U.S. announcement 
that it would support the Philippines’ South China Sea interests under the 
U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. I examine two hypotheses for these policy
shifts: first, that the changes occurred from the rise of China as a result of shifting
balance of power and assertiveness; and second, that the United States was influenced
by regional allies and partners to take a stronger stance on these issues. The evidence
shows that the U.S. policy change on sovereignty was driven by a combination of a
balance-of-power shift as well as several belligerent Chinese activities in the South
China Sea starting in the beginning of 2020. The U.S. decision to clarify the bounds of its
defense treaty with the Philippines was driven by a combination of a balance-of-power
shift and the behavior of the Philippine government. Moving forward, the United States
must show a firm commitment to upholding these new positions while simultaneously
messaging its commitment to regional peace and global stability.
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
Since the end of the Cold War, the South China Sea has developed into a region of 
increasing interaction between the United States and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). While the United States has no territorial claims to the South China Sea’s disputed 
features, America has vested interests in the South China Sea and is becoming increasingly 
involved in the South China Sea disputes. With respect to the many facets of the South 
China Sea political situation, the United States has been involved in multiple areas of policy 
interest to include freedom of navigation, resource exploration, maritime rights, territorial 
sovereignty, and security concerns.  
As the economic and military influence of the PRC began to grow through the 
1990s and 2000s, leading to sporadic conflictual interactions with other nations claiming 
territorial rights over disputed South China Sea features, the United States primarily relied 
on regional countries and claimants to manage the issues themselves. For instance, 
beginning in 1992, regional efforts led by the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) to create a formalized code of conduct (COC) for interactions between South 
China Sea claimants worked to mitigate the chance of conflict as the frequency of 
interactions between claimants increased.1 Even though the United States was not a direct 
partner in the effort to draft and pass the COC, America supported these efforts, as well as 
any effort that was aimed at resolving the disputes in a peaceful manner consistent with 
international maritime law.  
As presidential administrations have changed, United States’ policy positions with 
respect to South China Sea have been historically consistent across different presidencies, 
but major changes have occurred over the last decade. Major changes occurred in two 
policy areas in particular, the legality of territorial claims and the U.S. alliance with the 
 
1 Jiye Kim and Daniel Druckman, “Shelved Sovereignty or Invalid Sovereignty? The South China Sea 
Negotiations, 1992-2016,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 1 (November 2018): 38, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1535520. 
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Philippines. The first major change happened in the late 2000s when the Obama 
administration moved the U.S. position away from one of neutrality on territorial 
sovereignty in the South China Sea. The new policy was to position the U.S. stance more 
aggressively against claims that were not based in international law. While the Obama 
administration thinly veiled the aim of its new policy at the PRC, the new U.S. position on 
sovereignty was overtly emphasized during the Trump administration when the U.S. 
position was updated to clearly oppose Chinese sovereignty claims. The second major 
change happened in 2019 and regarded the applicability of the U.S.–Philippines Mutual 
Defense Treaty (MDT). This policy—previously ambiguous—was altered during the 
Trump presidency to make the treaty specifically applicable in the case of conflict over the 
Philippines’ disputed features in the South China Sea.  
This thesis provides and investigates two explanations for the U.S. policy changes. 
First, the United States is reacting to the rise of China: a) the change in the balance of 
global power driven by China’s rise, and b) Chinese provocations and belligerent activity 
in the South China Sea. Second, that the United States is adjusting its policy positions 
because of the influence, desires, and pressure from ally and partner countries in Asia. 
I find that both of these policy changes have resulted from the changing balance-
of-power in Asia driven by the economic, military, and diplomatic rise of China at the sake 
of the United States. Additionally, I find that the timing of the U.S. policy change regarding 
territorial sovereignty suggests it is in reaction to a set of aggressive Chinese actions that 
started in early 2020. Furthermore, the U.S.–Philippines MDT change, while not a result 
of specific Chinese belligerence, has been driven by the pressure applied by the Philippine 
government which places U.S. strategic plans in Asia at risk. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Comprehending the evolution of U.S. policy with respect to sovereignty and 
territorial defense, specifically understanding why changes have happened in those policy 
areas, is worthy of investigation for reasons of diplomatic cooperation and regional 
security. From a diplomatic cooperation standpoint, consistency in U.S. policy reassures 
allies that are reliant on U.S. security commitments and are too ill-equipped or ill-prepared 
3 
to successfully uphold their own foreign policy interests. In the South China Sea, the 
United States is viewed by partner nations as a balancing force to burgeoning PLA power 
projection capabilities. The continued trust in U.S. support and commitment provides 
strength to the durability of U.S.-allied nation relationships. Major changes in policy 
positions can throw security cooperation between the United States and its allies into 
uncertainty and open the United States up to substantial criticism if its’ foreign policies are 
not supportive of international law and actionable. In the case of sovereignty, policy 
changes that appear aimed either for or against Chinese claims to disputed features have 
secondary effects on the other South China Sea claimants involved in the dispute. Actions 
which weaken international faith in American commitment to peace and freedom can have 
an adverse effect on the willingness of partner nations to support U.S. actions in a time of 
crisis. 
In terms of regional security, changes in policy can place country-to-country 
relationships at risk or open venues for America’s enemies to exploit those relationships. 
For instance, the perception and actuality of U.S. support for Philippine arbitration under 
UNCLOS against the PRC resulted in creating additional challenges for the U.S.–PRC 
relationship in the wake of a series of confrontational military interactions. Similarly, 
changes in policy can be a casus belli in that actions taken by the United States to position 
itself advantageously against China’s growing influence could be the trigger for belligerent 
actions or increase the danger of potential military escalation. Ensuring that policy 
decisions are actionable and do not overstretch U.S. military commitments is key to 
positioning the U.S. diplomatic corps and armed forces for sustained success in an era of 
renewed great power conflict in Asia. From an international cooperation standpoint, U.S. 
foreign policy has been questioned substantially in the wake of the Trump administration’s 
unpredictability and risks being misinterpreted or misjudged as non-substantial or non-
defensible. Ensuring that U.S. foreign policy positions are solid and meaningful is key to 
mitigating conflict in the South China Sea where the stakes of a conventional war would 
be dire.  
4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In an effort to understand why the U.S. has altered its stances on both sovereignty 
of disputed island features and the U.S.–Philippines MDT, the potential explanations for 
these changes must be analyzed. This literature review outlines four schools of thought that 
explain these changes in U.S. policy with respect to the South China Sea. The first school 
of thought explains the changes as a U.S. reaction to a broader shift in the geopolitical 
balance of power. The second school of thought explains changes in U.S. policy as a 
reaction to Chinese activity and belligerence in South China Sea in order to maintain the 
status quo. The third school of thought explains these changes as a result of the influence 
of U.S. ally and partner nations. Given the importance of these first three schools of 
thought, they will be further investigated in Chapter III and Chapter IV of this thesis. A 
fourth school of thought, that U.S. policy decisions are both heavily influenced by and 
derived from the personalities of the administrations that they are enacted under, is 
discussed in the literature review but will not be used for subsequent analysis.  
1. Reactions to a Shift in the Global Balance of Power 
The first explanation for a change in U.S. policy is that America’s actions are a 
result of changing geopolitical balance of power, which indicates that the United States 
will soon be supplanted by China as the dominant force in global affairs. According to this 
theory, American foreign policy has been increasingly driven by attempts to maintain its 
leadership of the global international order, particularly in the wake of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis and two wars in the Middle East which damaged America’s global image.2 
The economic and security challenges faced by the United States were coupled with a 
growth of military and economic might in China. As Joseph Liow, professor and former 
dean of Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, describes the situation, 
as China’s relative power has grown, it created “a strategic dilemma that will exercise the 
 
2 Alice Ba, “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the 
Waters?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (2011): 281, https://doi.org/10.1355/cs33-3a. 
5 
U.S. foreign policy establishment for many years to come as it seeks to balance between 
accommodating China’s rise and maintaining American primacy.”3 
This shift in balance of power theory is supported by Brantly Womack, professor 
of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, who postulates that two specific 
developments affected U.S. policy in Asia. The first development was China’s better 
economic performance relative to its neighbors and the United States in the aftermath of 
the Global Financial Crisis, while the second development was its increase in military 
capability, particularly since 2008, relative to the United States.4 Sarah Rain and Christian 
Le Miere claim that U.S. policy in greater Asia and the South China Sea in particular has 
also been driven by “concerns of grand strategy” regarding the maintenance of the balance 
of power in Asia.5 According to these two authors, the U.S. focus on Asia during the 
Obama period aimed to “bolster the U.S. presence in the region and reduce uncertainty 
there regarding its commitments, whilst also warning China away from any temptation… 
to employ more heavy-handed tactics.”6 
Andrew Scobell argues in support of the changing balance of power theory but 
focuses on its geopolitical aspects. Scobell asserts that both China and the United States 
have attached greater geostrategic importance to the South China Sea in the wake of the 
Cold War and that changes in Chinese power are affecting U.S. naval predominance in the 
South China Sea. For Scobell, changes in U.S. behavior are a result of China increasing its 
blue water naval capabilities and military influence in a region where the U.S. Navy had 
 
3 Joseph Chinyong Liow, Ambivalent Engagement: The United States and Regional Security in 
Southeast Asia after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 237, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/book/55769/. 
4 Brantly Womack, “The Spratlys: From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (2011): 371–72, https://doi.org/10.1355/cs33-3e. 
5 Sarah Raine and Christian Le Miere, “Chapter Four: The U.S. in the South China Sea,” in Regional 
Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes, 1st ed., vol. 53, Adelphi Series (London, United Kingdom: 
Routledge, 2013), 151, https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2013.779492. 
6 Raine and Le Miere, 153. 
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previously been unchallenged in its ability to operate.7 Denny Roy finds a similar rational 
for U.S. policy behavior and terms the current contention in the South China Sea as a 
competition between an existing “Pax Americana” and a rising “Pax Sinica” over a region 
where the United States has long been the preeminent power.8 If viewed from this 
standpoint, changes in U.S. policy are primarily motivated by geopolitical factors 
stemming from a change in the balance of power.  
Some scholars, while agreeing that U.S. policy changes are a result of its desire to 
maintain the current status quo, indicate that U.S. policy shifts have been manufactured in 
order to give credence to the United States’ renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific. In regard 
to the South China Sea, Chu Shulong claims that the United States “invented trouble there 
to ‘return to Asia’ and ‘rebalance’ the Chinese rising role and influence in Asia.”9 This 
take is interesting because it views U.S. policy decisions as reactionary but as more 
aggressively motivated and ill-intentioned at keeping a balance of power shift from 
occurring.  
This balance-of-power shift theory is worth pursuing because it does not couple all 
U.S. Asian policy directly to China—even though China plays a large role in its creation. 
If evidence is available to support this as an explanation for specific U.S. policy 
adjustments, it may lend similar explanations for broader trends in U.S. foreign policy. 
2. Reactions to Chinese Belligerence 
A second explanation is that the United States’ policy changes are reactions to 
specific instances of belligerent diplomatic and military behavior by the Chinese. Michael 
McDevitt claims that, with respect to disputed island features in the South China Sea, 
Chinese land reclamation activity “put pressure on the U.S. to respond,” even though 
 
7 Andrew Scobell, “The South China Sea and U.S.-China Rivalry,” Political Science Quarterly 133, 
no. 2 (2018): 224, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12772. 
8 Denny Roy, “The United States and the South China Sea: Front Line of Hegemonic Tension?,” in 
The South China Sea Dispute, ed. Ian James Storey and Cheng-Yi Lin, 1st ed. (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof 
Ishak Institute, 2016), 239, Project Muse. 
9 Chu Shulong, “China and the United States in Southeast Asia,” in China, the United States, and the 
Future of Southeast Asia, ed. David B.H. Denoon (New York, N.Y.: NYU Press, 2017), 345, Project Muse. 
7 
America had no direct stake in the sovereignty disputes between claimant nations.10 
According to McDevitt and other experts who follow this theory, U.S. policy evolved to 
take a more aggressive stance against apparent Chinese land grabbing activities that were 
contrary to the liberal world order.  
Marvin Ott also largely ascribes the current trends in U.S. policy focus on Asia to 
a combination of factors with the most notable of those being, “increasingly overt claims 
to Chinese sovereignty over nearly all of the South China Sea.”11 According to Ott, the 
combination of aggressive diplomatic claims to disputed South China Sea territory, 
combined with an expansive military buildup and modernization—specifically a naval 
expansion—have been the dominant drivers for a newfound aggressiveness in U.S. policies 
as they apply to the South China Sea. In 2015, a team of experts from the Congressional 
Research Service conducted an analysis on PRC land reclamation activities which focused 
heavily on the military implications of Chinese island dredging and subsequent 
improvements in military armament of those islands.12 The analysis provided a series of 
policy recommendations, including stronger U.S. statements to China, increased 
publicizing of China’s activities, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and increased frequency 
of Navy operations in the region, which were aimed specifically at countering Chinese 
territorial and military ambitions in the South China Sea.13 This advice to Congress 
suggests that U.S. policy changes are driven in a reactionary fashion to specific Chinese 
activity in the South China Sea.  
Michael Green’s analysis of the Obama administration’s Asia policy decisions also 
supports this theory. Green proposes that the Obama administration’s clarification of 
 
10 Michael McDevitt, “U.S. Policy Options in the South China Sea,” in China, The United States, and 
the Future of Southeast Asia, ed. David B.H. Denoon (New York, N.Y.: NYU Press, 2017), 389, Project 
Muse. 
11 Marvin C. Ott, “U.S. Security Strategy and Southeast Asia,” in China, the United States, and the 
Future of Southeast Asia, ed. David B.H. Denoon (New York, N.Y.: NYU Press, 2017), 371, Project Muse. 
12 Ben Dolven et al., “Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy 
Options,” Current Politics and Economics of Northern and Western Asia 24, no. 2/3 (2015): 334–40. 
13 Dolven et al., 343–44. 
8 
Article V of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty as applicable to Japan’s disputed 
Senkaku Islands with China was a direct result of “increasingly blatant Chinese coercion 
against other claimants in the South China Sea,” and that “American policy was reacting 
to events, not shaping them.”14 Phuong Nguyen claims that U.S. policy interests in the 
South China Sea became more focused following the 2009 USNS Impeccable harassment 
incident, the submission of China’s 9-Dash line map to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
and its island building campaign between 2013 and 2015.15 Toshi Yoshihara and James 
Holmes postulate, when discussing U.S. policy in rebalancing to Asia, that U.S. reactions 
have always been driven by China and that it is in America’s interest to more aggressively 
compete with China from a position of strength.16 
This theory is worth pursuing because ample data may exist that can correlate 
changes in U.S. policy positions to specific Chinese activity. If this data is available, then 
it may be useful in analyzing the effectiveness of U.S. policy actions in deterring PRC 
aggressiveness, and it may also help convince allies and partners of the intentions behind 
U.S. policy activity in the South China Sea. 
3. Result of Alliance Partner Influence  
A third explanation is that U.S. policy can and is influenced by ally and partner 
nations. In this theory, if small states maximize use of their political clout and increase the 
relative value of their alliance partnership, they can hold sway over the policies of their 
larger allies. In 1971, political scientist Robert Keohane wrote an article titled “The Big 
Influence of Small Allies,” which outlined the effect smaller allied countries have on their 
larger partners. Keohane argued that smaller U.S. allies have not only been able to freely 
pursue their national interests but have effectively used their alliances with the United 
 
14 Michael Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia 
Pacific Since 1783 (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2017), 528, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=4784110. 
15 Phuong Nguyen, “Deciphering the Shift in America’s South China Sea Policy,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 38, no. 3 (2016): 397–401, https://doi.org/10.1355/cs38-3b. 
16 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Responding to China’s Rising Sea Power,” Orbis 61, no. 1 
(Winter 2017): 92, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2016.12.009. 
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States to sway U.S. policy and impact U.S. public perception.17 According to Keohane, 
small allies succeed in influencing U.S. policy by having a combination of 1) a high degree 
of flexibility in their “own domestic politics,” 2) a supportive policy toward U.S. interests, 
and 3) an ability to create a mutually dependent relationship with the U.S. government.”18 
Those smaller states that are capable of meeting these prerequisites seek out U.S. alliance 
partnerships because it provides them an avenue to exert sway over U.S. policy interests. 
Keohane’s argument is supported by contemporary authors including Evan 
Mederios et al. of the Rand Corporation who analyzed the impact of six current U.S. partner 
nations on U.S. policies. Mederios and his team found that, with growing security 
challenges in Asia, the U.S. needs access to the region in order to meet its national 
objectives. Therefore, the United States will need the cooperation of allies and partners 
who it has to incentivize for participation regional security goals, and the United States will 
need to keep up perceptions that it will remain engaged in the region.19 It follows that the 
needs and pursuits of American partners and allies will have a shaping effect U.S. policy. 
Furthermore, these scholars argue that, of their six nation case studies, “all believe that 
U.S. policy toward China and toward Asia as a whole will have a strong and determining 
influence on whether China’s rise is stabilizing or destabilizing in the region.”20 
Accordingly, all of these countries are incentivized to influence the United States’ Asia 
policy so that they can interact with China from a position of assurance by maintaining the 
U.S. as the primary balancing force in the region.21 
Bonnie Glaser and David Szerlip conducted a similar study to that of Mederios and 
the Rand Corporation. Glaser and Szerlip looked at three of the United States’ strongest 
 
17 Robert Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, no. 2 (Spring 1971): 162, 
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21 Mederios et al., 233–34. 
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alliance partnerships in Asia—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—and concluded that 
these countries have “opted to strengthen ties with the U.S. military, seeing this as the 
best—and cheapest—way to defend their national interests.”22 Glaser and Szerlip’s data 
shows that their case study nations are behaving as Keohane expected by creating a 
fundamentally strong relationship with U.S. government institutions, specifically the U.S. 
military, in order to have influence over U.S. regional behavior. These countries are 
strongly incentivized to keep the direction of U.S. policy at the center of their national 
strategy because they rely on their alliance to counterbalance their own domestic defense 
inadequacies.23 
This alliance-partner influence theory is worthy of further investigation because of 
the two policy changes being assessed in this thesis, both are associated with multiple U.S. 
allies and partners who have concerns or interests tied to the outcome. If adequate 
information exists to show that allied and partner nations have a significant impact on U.S. 
policy changes then there may be other implications for the important role that U.S. 
alliances will play in future U.S.-Chinese competition in Asia. 
4. Result of Personality Politics 
A fourth explanation, which will not be further investigated by this paper, is that 
current U.S. policy changes have been driven by the personality politics of Washington 
and domestic forces. Here, scholars tend to focus on the Trump presidency’s deviation 
from previous U.S. support for the global liberal international order towards more 
nationalistic and populist ideals. Mark Beeson characterized the Trump administration’s 
approach to foreign policy as shaped by the president’s previous experience in business. 
Policy actions were therefore marked by a “transactional” business-like behavior, which 
was nationalistic and appeared intentionally anti-global in nature as a result of Trump’s 
 
22 Bonnie S. Glaser and David Szerlip, “U.S. Allies Respond: Japanese, Australian, and South Korean 
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personal distain for international agreements.24 Accordingly, U.S. policy changes—
globally and not just in reference to Asia or the South China Sea—were the result of the 
Trump administration’s disregard for the tools of globalization that had backed American 
power. In placing national priorities above all else, U.S. foreign policy could break from 
traditional patterns of behavior and take on a more personality driven approach.  
Tow supports a conceptualization of U.S. foreign policy driven by aspects of 
personality politics. Similar to Beeson, Tow assesses that the Trump administration’s 
foreign policy is derived from “his background in the business world—’hard but fluid 
bargaining to derive optimal results for interests-based objectives’.”25 He categorizes the 
Trump administration’s foreign affairs agenda as “driven by the pursuit of those domestic 
economic and political objectives” that the president viewed essential to supporting his 
America-first agenda.26 Lowell Dittmer reaches the same conclusion in that he attributes 
most of Trump’s behavior to his personal and professional development before becoming 
president. He credits Trump’s policy behavior in a large way to his personality traits and 
experience in business claiming that he “brings at least one unique quirk to the office: an 
obsession with ‘deals’”27 
While it is highly probable that the personalities and domestic concerns of U.S. 
administrations play an important role in setting foreign policy agenda, it is too short 
sighted to consider only those factors when analyzing major changes in U.S. policy towards 
Asia. This school of thought does not consider external factors such as Chinese military 
activity or the shift in the global balance of power towards Asia as motivators to change 
American policy. 
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This thesis examines two hypotheses, which provide potential explanations for the 
major shifts made in U.S. foreign policy with respect to the South China Sea over the past 
decade. The first hypothesis focuses on U.S. policy changes as reactions to the rise of China 
and consists of two parts. First, that changes to the U.S. position on South China Sea 
territorial sovereignty and the applicability of the U.S.–Philippines MDT, have been the 
result of a reaction to a shift in the global balance of power. The second, and closely related, 
part of this hypothesis is that these U.S. policy changes are reactions to specific instances 
of Chinese diplomatic or military belligerence. 
My second hypothesis is that United States altered its South China Sea policies 
towards territorial sovereignty and the U.S.–Philippines MDT because of the desires, 
needs, and influence of allied nations and partners in Southeast Asia. This hypothesis is 
based on an idea that U.S. policy makers are motivated to adjust regional behavior at the 
behest of other nations who have weaker means of their own to effectively support their 
own policy positions.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to evaluate the strength of these arguments, I intend to collect, examine, 
and interpret evidence and analyzed how well it explains why U.S. policy has been adjusted 
in the South China Sea. The first hypothesis will be supported by evidence such as official 
statements, documents, testimony, diplomatic policy efforts, military force adjustments, 
and economic endeavors, as well as by evidence that U.S. policy changes are timed in 
response to Chinese military or diplomatic activity. Any evidence that appears to relate 
U.S. policy actions to domestic political factors unrelated to a China-centric explanation 
will weaken this argument.  
The second hypothesis will be supported by any evidence that directly links U.S. 
policy changes to formal or informal requests by allies, official statements, documents, and 
testimony citing allies as a rational for U.S. action, and by any dialogue between key 
leaders of U.S. partner nations that emphasizes the importance of these or similar policy 
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actions. Additionally, any evidence that indicates U.S. policy changes are timed in response 
to pressure from ally and partner nations would also support this hypothesis. 
F. MAIN FINDINGS AND ORGANIZATION  
My main findings are that the U.S. policy changes on territorial sovereignty and the 
U.S.–Philippines MDT are both reactions by the United States to the changing balance-of-
power that favors China. Additionally, the timing of the sovereignty policy change has 
been driven by a recent series of aggressive Chinese activity in the South China Sea. 
Furthermore, the U.S.–Philippines MDT change has been spurred by pressure from the 
Philippines government seeking assurance of U.S. regional commitment. 
This thesis is composed of four subsequent chapters. Chapter II attempts to prove 
that substantive changes in U.S. policy have in fact taken place regarding both the U.S. 
position on the sovereignty of South China Sea disputed island features, and the U.S. 
position on the applicability of its MDT with the Philippines. Chapter III focuses on 
investigating the first set of possible explanation for U.S. policy changes—that they result 
from 1) attempts to mitigate the waning of American global influence and power, or 2) that 
they are reactions to China’s more aggressive behavior. Chapter IV analyzes the second 
explanation, that U.S. policy changes have been largely affected by the influence and 
demand from allies and partners for a more aggressive American stance in the South China 
Sea. Chapter V provides the conclusion for this thesis, the merits of the explanations, and 
discusses the potential implications for the future of U.S. policy in the South China Sea. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF U.S. SOUTH CHINA SEA POLICY AREAS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past thirty years the policies of the United States government regarding 
the South China Sea have undergone a series of subtle and direct changes. While the 
disputed islands and low-tide features fall under multiple policies areas, this chapter will 
focus on identifying the evolution of two areas in U.S. policy in particular. First, the 
evolution of U.S. policy with respect to territorial sovereignty and second, the application 
of the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to disputed island features. Adjustments in 
both statements and documents published by executive branch and State Department 
leadership with respect to the South China Sea show that these policies have been adjusted 
and, in some cases, changed abruptly.  
In order to show the evolution of the policy areas of sovereignty and defense 
treaties, this chapter will trace the history of U.S. policy regarding the sovereignty dispute 
over South China Sea island and low-tide features starting from the formalization of the 
policy in the post-Cold War era. Second, the evolution of U.S. policy regarding the 
application of the U.S.–Philippines MDT with respect to the South China Sea will be 
assessed beginning with a brief overview of its origin during the Cold War. The lineage of 
these two policy areas will be drawn out through reference to historical and contemporary 
policy documents with the purpose of identifying and isolating key policy changes. This 
will then allow subsequent chapters to focus on the discussion of why such changes 
occurred and attempt to explain them.  
The U.S. positions on sovereignty claims and defense treaty application are utilized 
as the primary focuses of this analysis because they are both highly visible to the 
international community and have the potential to profoundly impact the possibility of 
future conflict in Southeast Asia. U.S. policy with respect to sovereignty over disputed 
features in the South China Sea is something that became formalized in the post-Cold War 
as interactions between competing claimant nations increased in both intensity and 
potential for escalation. Clarification of U.S. policy with respect to the application of its 
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U.S.–Philippines MDT in the South China Sea was, for the most part, intentionally avoided 
until almost the end of the Trump presidency.  
B. SOVEREIGNTY 
1. U.S. Policy on Territorial and Maritime Sovereignty 
In the case of the South China Sea, the United States established an early precedent 
of intentional neutrality with respect to the individual claims of nations on disputed 
territorial features. As far as official policy statements show, the United States refrained 
from directly establishing or clarifying any specific policy with respect to the South China 
Sea until 1995 when the U.S. State Department issued a press release in reaction to a 
growing People’s Republic of China presence on disputed features in the South China Sea. 
Specifically, PRC expansion onto several contested island and low-tide features that are 
inside the Philippines’ claimed Exclusive Economic Zone triggered the need for the U.S. 
to formally establish its position regarding the myriad of claims in the Spratly Islands. 
The U.S. policy established by this State Department press release marked the first 
official position in the post-Cold War era that the U.S. took with respect to the South China 
Sea. At the time, the United States had just undergone a significant reduction in its Navy 
and Air Force readiness in the Western Pacific with the closure of Subic Bay Naval Base 
and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The policy was delivered in a press release 
vice a more official policy document indicating the low level of importance of Southeast 
Asian policy in the mid-1990s. The policy statement had five key components that 
established the precedent for U.S. South China Sea policy. The first section of the statement 
read that, “The United States strongly opposes the use or threat of force to resolve 
competing claims and urges all claimants to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing 
actions,” establishing a stance against a resolution via use of force to the dispute.28 The 
next point of the statement read that, “the United States calls upon claimants to intensify 
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diplomatic efforts which address issues related to the competing claims, taking into account 
the interests of all parties, and which contribute to peace and prosperity in the region. The 
United States is willing to assist in any way that the claimants deem helpful. The United 
States reaffirms its welcome of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea.”29 
This established that U.S. policy would adhere to diplomatic solutions to the territorial 
disputes, and that the United States would assist in resolving the problem peacefully if 
asked. The third portion of the press release stated that “maintaining freedom of navigation 
is a fundamental interest of the United States. Unhindered navigation by all ships and 
aircraft in the South China Sea is essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-
Pacific region, including the United States.”30 This portion of the press release effectively 
reaffirmed the importance of free and open navigation of the high seas, particularly in the 
South China Sea, and that claims by individual nations would not stop American transit of 
those areas. Finally, the press release touched on the issue of sovereignty saying, “the 
United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty 
over the various island, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South China Sea. The United States 
would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime 
activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”31 Effectively, the United 
States refused to take the legal side of one contestant in the South China Sea dispute over 
another, but retained its right to an opinion should a contestant overstep its bounds in the 
dispute in a way that violated the principles of UNCLOS. It is this last section of the 1995 
statement that has been significantly altered in the twenty-six years since it was written. 
This State Department press release established a precedent of U.S. neutrality with 
respect to sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. The five points that it laid out 
regarding sovereignty, use of force, diplomacy, freedom of navigation, and consistency 






early 2000s. In 2001, United States’ attention was drawn again to the South China Sea 
when the PRC and U.S. naval air forces became embroiled over the EP-3 Hainan Island 
incident. As of September 2001, the United States maintained “strict neutrality” and 
continued to refuse comment on the merits of any of the involved nation’s claims.32 The 
first changes to this policy came in 2009 at the beginning of the Obama administration 
when a slew of international engagements with ASEAN and other Southeast Asian nations 
led to a gradual redefinition of the neutrality that was laid out in the original 1995 policy. 
2. Changes in the Concept of Neutrality, Philippines UNCLOS 
Arbitration, and Limits of the Sea 
Beginning in 2009, the Obama administration started a series of statements and 
actions that adjusted the precedents established by the 1995 State Department policy from 
neutrality on sovereignty to a qualified position based in legalism. The first adjustments to 
policy revolved around adjusting the concept of strict neutrality that had been originally 
laid out. According to Chen Cihang of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing 
Initiative, the U.S. government “narrowed the scope of ‘neutrality’ set forth in the 1995 
policy statement” from having no stance on any of the legal claims in the South China Sea 
“to taking no position on the sovereignty over various islands and reefs,” while starting “to 
take a clear position on the maritime claims of all claimants.”33 Statements made by the 
various members of State Department leadership support Chen’s claim. In July of 2009, 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Scot 
Marciel, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. policy remained 
neutral when taking “sides on the competing legal claims over territorial sovereignty in the 
South China Sea.”34 However, he went on to clarify that, although the United States did 
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not support sovereignty claims to physical land features and their territorial seas, the United 
States was opposed to “claims to ‘territorial waters’ or any maritime zone that were not 
derived from a land territory.”35 This statement implied that the United States would take 
a stronger stance against nations that made claims to maritime territories that were not in 
line with international law as upheld by UNCLOS. Marciel did go on to uphold the other 
points of the original 1995 policy, including the opposition to the use of force to resolve 
sovereignty disputes and the desire to “see a resolution in accordance with international 
law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”36 This new, more active form 
of neutrality was reiterated during Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ comments at the 9th 
IISS Asia Security Summit Shangri-La Dialogue in June of 2010. Gates’s stated that U.S. 
policy remained clearly in support of “stability, freedom of navigation, and free and 
unhindered economic development,” while stating that the U.S. opposed “the use of force 
and actions that hinder freedom of navigation.”37  
At the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi Vietnam on July 23, 2010, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used the opportunity to further clarify the United States’ 
position to the international community. Her remarks reinforced the adjustment in the U.S. 
stance away from strict neutrality and closer towards an active opposition to claims that 
were made not “in accordance with the UN convention on law of the sea.”38 Furthermore, 
Secretary Clinton urged that “legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea 
should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features”.39 As opposed to the 
completely neutral policy laid out in 1995, the U.S. administration had now clarified its 
previous statement so that the United States could take a position on maritime claims 
 
35 Senate. Statement Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
36 Senate. Statement Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
37 Robert M. Gates, First Plenary Session: Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific 
(Singapore: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2010), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100804080416/http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-
dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/first-plenary-session/robert-gates/. 
38 Hillary R. Clinton, Remarks at Press Availability (Hanoi, Vietnam: ASEAN, 17th ASEAN 
Regional Forum, 2010), //2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm. 
39 Clinton. 
20 
without directly picking a side regarding the legality of any individual territorial claim. 
This is a subtle but important shift because the U.S. loosened its neutrality with respect to 
taking sides on territorial disputes by emphasizing the need for claims to be made in 
accordance with UNCLOS and positioned itself against maritime claims that were not 
derived from UNCLOS. Of additional importance is that while the myriad of individual 
claims made by nations involved in the territorial dispute were disputable, this change 
appeared directed at the ambiguous maritime claims made by the PRC. 
Between 2010 and 2013 the United States continued to maintain a policy of 
territorial neutrality while emphasizing its desire to see all claims clarified with respect to 
UNCLOS, which the Obama administration worked diligently but unsuccessfully to ratify 
through the United States Congress. In January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines took 
legal action against the PRC at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague, 
Netherlands in order to challenge China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea under 
UNCLOS.40 During the three years that it took the PCA to reach an award with respect to 
its arbitration, the Obama government continued to direct U.S. policy away from a neutral 
stance. In February of 2014, Daniel Russel, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs testified before a congressional subcommittee that the United States 
took “a strong position that maritime claims must accord with customary international law. 
This means that all maritime claims must be derived from land features and otherwise 
comport with the international law of the sea … we certainly believe that claims in the 
South China Sea that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed.”41 In 
March of 2014 the U.S. State Department issues a press release that affirmed its support 
for the Philippines’ arbitration case stating that “we hope that this case serves to provide 
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greater legal certainty and compliance with the international law of the sea.”42 In a joint 
press conference with President Benigno Aquino in April of 2014, President Obama stated 
his support for the Philippines’ pursuance of “arbitration concerning territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea.”43 The president went on to clarify that the reason for U.S. support 
stemmed from opposition to the “coercion and intimidation” used by other nations to 
resolve the disputes.44 In December of 2014, the State Department published Limits in the 
Seas document number 143 titled China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, which 
speculated heavily on the legality of China’s territorial and maritime claims in the South 
China Sea with respect to UNCLOS but did not reaching a conclusion on their legitimacy45 
In July of 2016, following the PCA’s ruling in favor of the Philippines’s in the South China 
Sea, the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs released a press statement that 
supported the PCA’s findings, and called the ruling “an important contribution to the 
shared goal of a peaceful resolution to disputes in the South China Sea.”46 
The multitude of press releases and public statements made between 2009 and 2016 
by the Obama administration changed the strict concept of neutrality that was laid out in 
1995. By clarifying that the United States did find merit with those claims made in 
accordance with UNCLOS and by clarifying that the United States would take a position 
against maritime claims while remaining “neutral” on territorial sovereignty, the 
ambiguously neutral stance laid out in 1995 was whittled away a piece at a time. By the 
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end of the Obama presidency, U.S. policy appeared far less neutral than it had twenty-two 
years before. 
3. The Trump Administration’s Change in U.S. South China Sea Policy 
On 13 July 2020, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo released the U.S. Position on 
Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. In this statement, Secretary Pompeo declared, 
“Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely 
unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them.”47 The secretary of state also said 
that the PRC had “no coherent legal basis for its ‘Nine-Dashed Line’ claim in the South 
China Sea” and reiterated support for the PCA’s ruling which had rejected the PRC’s 
claims and ruled in favor of the Philippines from 2016. Furthermore, Pompeo expressed 
that the U.S. was clarifying its position in order to align with the 2016 tribunal decision, 
specifically that the PRC had “no lawful territorial or maritime claim” to features such as 
Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Vanguard Bank, Luconia Shoals, Natuna Besar, and 
James Shoal.48 Importantly, the key difference between this Trump administration policy 
and the Obama administration policy is that this statement marked a complete break with 
any pretense of neutrality regarding individual territorial and sovereignty claims that had 
previously been maintained.  
C. U.S.–PHILIPPINES MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY  
1. Initial Application of the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty 
Similar to the sovereignty case, a discernable change in the U.S. policy position on 
the application of its U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty in the South China Sea is 
observable. The United States established an early desire to refrain from clarifying the 
applicability of U.S. military intervention in the South China Sea on the Philippines behalf. 
The original text of the U.S.–Philippines MDT signed on 30 August, 1951 stated in Article 
IV that “each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the 
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Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to 
meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.”49 The 
applicability of this statement was clarified in the subsequent Article V which stated, “ For 
the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an 
armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties or on the island territories 
under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its own armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in 
the Pacific.”50 Although Article V states that U.S.–Philippines mutual defense applied to 
island territories, it was initially ambiguous whether or not mutual defense would apply to 
the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea.  
In January of 1974, as the Vietnam War ended, the PRC defeated the South 
Vietnamese in a brief battle and occupied the Paracel Islands.51 This sparked concern 
amongst Republic of the Philippines leadership that the Chinese might make a military 
move to consolidate their claims in the Spratly Islands. At the time the American 
Ambassador to the Philippines requested guidance from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
regarding whether or not the MDT would apply if Philippine forces in the Spratlys came 
under PRC attack.52 During a staff meeting on 31 January, 1974, Kissinger discussed the 
concern over invoking the MDT with respect to the Spratly Islands and said that the U.S. 
would not invoke the MDT but simultaneously refused to clarify the applicability of the 
treaty with respect to disputed islands.53 Five months after the Paracel Islands incident the 
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State Department had yet to clarify its position on the applicability of the U.S.–Philippines 
MDT and the secretary of state went so far as to order the U.S. ambassador to the 
Philippines to cease and desist any further discussion with the Philippines regarding the 
applicability of the defense treaty.54 This position of intentional ambiguity with respect to 
the applicability of the U.S.–Philippines MDT was maintained by the various other 
administrations through the end of the Cold War. 
2. Continued Ambiguity in the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty  
Following the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy continued to be intentionally 
ambiguous when it came to the application of the U.S.–Philippines MDT with respect to 
disputed territories in the South China Sea. The Clinton administration maintained this 
stance through its entire presidency and refused to clarify its position even though the PRC 
expanded its occupation in the Spratly Islands to include Mischief Reef. In a publication 
of the Manila Standard newspaper from February 1995, Republic of the Philippines 
President Fidel Ramos was paraphrased as saying that he expected the United States to 
intervene militarily in its dispute over the Spratly Islands with China should a shooting war 
start.55 Ramos was quickly countered by his Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo who 
postulated that the U.S.–Philippines MDT “does not bind the United States to come to the 
defense of the Philippines in case of armed conflict” in the Spratly Islands.56 From the 
perspective of the Foreign Secretary the MDT covered “only to the ‘metropolitan territory’ 
of which Kalayaan [the Spratly Islands] is not a part.”57 President Clinton adeptly dodged 
any specific commitment to invoking the MDT to assist the Philippines by voicing to 
President Ramos that the “United States will not allow the use of force to solve the dispute 
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in the Spratlys.”58 In May of 1995, at the same State Department press meeting that clearly 
defined the U.S. position of neutrality with respect to sovereignty issues, the State 
Department spokesperson avoided linking any application of the MDT to the potential 
maritime conflicts regarding the Spratly Islands.59  
The intentional ambiguity of the MDT and the Spratly Islands continued through 
the George W. Bush administration. Unlike the 1990s, when the PRC occupation of 
Mischief Reef and the Taiwan Strait Crisis had taken the attention of the Clinton 
administration, the Bush White House was consumed with the Global War on Terror. In 
the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001, the Bush administration released 
a joint statement on the status of the U.S.–Philippines MDT which focused its attention on 
“increased training, exercises, and other joint activities,” while emphasizing the 
agreement’s importance “in advancing peace and stability in the Asia Pacific for the past 
half a century.”60 The Bush administration’s bilateral relationship with the Philippines 
focused on the implementation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), Muslim 
insurgency in the southern Philippines, and the scandal-ridden change in Philippines 
leadership from President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo.61 No additional clarification to the applicability of the MDT with respect to the 
South China Sea territories was made during the Bush presidency. 
During the Obama administration there was no further clarification on “the 
circumstances under which the U.S. armed forces would intervene on behalf of the 
Philippines,” even though renewed PRC activity in island building and militarization came 
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to a peak during that time frame.62 The continued intentional ambiguity of the Obama 
administration is evidenced by the request of Senator Jim Webb, Chairman of the East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, to the State Department asking for clarification 
on “U.S. treaty commitments to come to the aid of the Philippines in light of recent reports 
of China’s use of force in the South China Sea.”63 Further support for continued ambiguity 
came during a 2014 press conference between President Obama and President Aquino III 
in Manila when President Obama was directly asked whether or not the United States 
would “defend the Philippines in case the territorial dispute with China … becomes an 
armed conflict?”64 President Obama avoided answering that question, instead relying on a 
reiteration of U.S. support for the respect of “international rules and norms,” opposition to 
“coercion and intimidation,” and support for the Philippines arbitration case at the 
Hague.65 In 2016, as tensions increased over Chinese island building and refusal to 
acknowledge the PCA’s ruling in favor of the Philippines, the United States avoided 
clarifying the applicability of its MDT with the Philippines even though both the U.S. and 
Philippines governments reinforced their commitment to the defense alliance.66 
3. Trump Administration’s Clarification of the MDT 
The intentional ambiguity of the 1951 MDT was altered in a March 2019 press 
availability between Secretary of State Pompeo and the Philippines Foreign Secretary 
Teodoro Locsin. In a clear break with previous avoidance of whether or not the MDT would 
apply to the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea, Secretary Pompeo stated, “China’s 
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island-building and military activities in the South China Sea threaten your sovereignty, 
security and therefore economic livelihood, as well as that of the United States. As the 
South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine Forces, aircraft, or 
public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 
4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”67 Secretary Pompeo’s remarks committed to triggering 
the MDT in the event that Philippine military, aircraft, or civilian vessels are attacked 
marks a direct break with previous hesitancy to act in direct support of Philippine interests 
in the South China Sea. The multitude of fishing vessels and military outposts held by the 
Republic of the Philippines and spread throughout the Spratlys leaves little possibility that 
an attack on a contested feature claimed by the Philippines would not trigger the MDT. 
Interpreting Secretary Pompeo’s statement leads to the possibility that future 
Chinese belligerence at or near contested South China Sea features should, at the very least, 
result in consultations between the United States and the Philippines as to whether or not 
the MDT should be triggered. This updated position on the scope of the MDT was reiterated 
in a joint Philippines-U.S. statement from the Department of Defense in November 2019, 
in which Secretary of Defense Mark Esper reiterated Secretary Pompeo’s statement that 
the MDT applied “to the entire Pacific region, including the South China Sea.”68 In the 
case of the U.S.–Philippines MDT, the Trump administration’s statements in March and 
November 2019 mark a clear break with previous intentional ambiguity in the U.S. policy 
with regards to the MDT and the South China Sea dispute. 
D. SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES 
In the policy areas of South China Sea sovereignty and the application of the U.S.–
Philippines MDT, there have been two major policy changes made by administrations since 
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the end of the Cold War. The first change regarding the position of neutrality on the legal 
merits of individual claims in the South China Sea started subtly during the Obama 
administration. That change was the adjustment from strict neutrality in reference to the 
legal merits of all claimants to taking a new position against claims not made in accordance 
with UNCLOS or tied to legitimate control of land features. Further clarification of this 
change came during the Trump administration when the State Department commented 
directly on the merits of China’s legal claims, taking a strong stance in opposition to them.  
Regarding the applicability of the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty there 
has been one major change that has occurred since the end of the Cold War. Until 2019 
every U.S. administration had avoided clarifying the scope of the U.S.–Philippines MDT 
in regard to conflict in the South China Sea, even as Chinese island reclamation and 
militarization reached a zenith in 2015. Secretary Pompeo’s statements from March of 
2019 made it clear that the Trump administration viewed further PRC aggression in the 
Spratly Islands against the Philippines as a legitimate reason to trigger Article IV of the 
1951 agreement, a position that had been avoided since the closing days of the Vietnam 
War. Having established that there were distinct policy changes in the areas of sovereignty 
and defense treaty application, the next portion of this research will attempt to answer why 
these changes happened when they did and what the implications of the changes are for 
future U.S. diplomatic interactions in Southeast Asia.  
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III. BALANCE OF POWER, CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS, AND 
CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY  
A. INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter II, I described the evolution of two specific policy changes, the first 
being the United States’ transition away from neutrality with respect to South China Sea 
sovereignty claims and the second being the clarification of the U.S.–Philippines MDT 
application to the South China Sea. Chapter III will focus on explaining why the United 
States altered these policies and will do so by investigating two China-centric explanations. 
The first is that the United States has adjusted its policies in reaction to a changing balance 
of power. As China’s relative power has grown the United States has acted in its own 
interest to maintain a position of supremacy. The second is that the United States has been 
forced to adjust its policies in reaction to aggressive Chinese diplomatic and military 
activity in the South China Sea.  
For the first explanation, that the United States is reacting to a changing balance of 
power vis a vis China, I find strong evidence that a balance of power change with the PRC 
caused both the U.S. policy change on South China Sea sovereignty and on the applicability 
of the U.S.–Philippines MDT. For the second explanation, that the United States is reacting 
to instances of Chinese assertiveness, I come to a different conclusion. There is strong 
evidence that instances of Chinese assertiveness drove the U.S. policy change on 
sovereignty. However, there is inadequate evidence to indicate that Chinese assertiveness 
triggered the U.S. policy change regarding the applicability of its Mutual Defense Treaty 
with the Philippines.  
This chapter will examine and analyze the evidence for both of these explanations. 
In the first section I will analyze the balance of power reaction explanation, and in the 
second section I will analyze the PRC actions explanation. In each section I will explain 
their application to broader U.S. strategic involvement in Asia, evaluate supporting 
evidence, and then apply their merits to the U.S. decision to change its policies regarding 
sovereignty and the U.S.–Philippines MDT. I will conclude the chapter with a 
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determination on the efficacy of both of these arguments as they apply to the changes in 
U.S. policy and broader U.S. involvement in South China Sea affairs.  
B. EXAMINATION OF THE CHANGING BOP EXPLANATION  
At its heart, the BOP-shift explanation is that as the United States saw its relative 
power in Asia declining with respect to China, it acted in an effort to reverse the changing 
trend in status quo and to maintain regional dominance. This section will use a combination 
of official government statements, academic analysis, economic information, and military 
data in order to show the United States’ policy activities in Asia have been driven by a need 
to react to its diminishing influence.  
Discussions regarding the longevity of the United States’ position as the only global 
superpower given the rise of China have been a subject of debate for over a decade, 
particularly following the Global Financial Crisis and the Obama administration’s 
rebalance to the Pacific in the wake of the two U.S. wars in the Middle East.69 At the end 
of the 2000s, United States faced a large mismatch in its commitments between its Atlantic 
and Pacific diplomatic, economic, and military investments. Simultaneously it was 
suffering from the highly damaging economic fallout caused by the Global Financial Crisis. 
The mismatch was amplified by a rapidly expanding Chinese economy and PRC military 
modernization program as the PRC developed into a rival power capable of supplanting 
U.S. influence in the Far East.  
China’s, and to a broader extent Asia’s, weathering of the Global Financial Crisis 
increased its strategic importance to the United States, and establish Asia as a region that 
the United States would compete fiercely for influence over.70 In a 2011 interview for 
Foreign Policy magazine, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claimed that channeling 
the growing economic power of Asia was “central to American economic and strategic 
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interests.”71 She also declared that U.S. economic recovery following the challenges of the 
Global Financial Crisis were hinged on “the ability of American firms to tap into the vast 
and growing consumer base of Asia.”72 By declaring a rebalance to Asia the United States 
desired to showcase the higher importance that Asia would play in future U.S. foreign 
policy, and that the United States was keen “on pursuing expanding U.S. interests in 
Asia.”73 
1. Discussion 
a. Shift in Economic Power 
According to Lawrence Lau of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, there has 
been a “gradual shift of the centre of the center of gravity in the world economy from North 
America and Western Europe to East Asia” over the past several decades.74 This shift in 
economic power has been a source of significant United States political attention, and as 
U.S. economic power declined specifically relative to China, the U.S. took some efforts to 
remain economically competitive in Asia. Between 1960 and 2017 the United States’ share 
of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from 38% to 24%, and Lau credits the loss 
to the rapidly growing GDPs of East Asian economies.75 The changing power dynamic 
became acutely noticeable during the recovery from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
when a combination of China’s foreign currency reserves (a total of USD $2 trillion), 
massive export market, and effective stimulus package for its domestic markets allowed 
 
71 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, no. 189 (December 2011): 56–63. 
72 Clinton. 
73 Saunders, “China’s Rising Power, the U.S. Rebalance to Asia, and Implications for U.S.-China 
Relations,” 38. 
74 Lawrence Juenyee Lau, The China-U.S. Trade War and Future Economic Relations (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2019), 8, http://muse.jhu.edu/book/66204. 
75 Lau, 7. 
32 
China to absorb economic blows felt by the West.76 It was the size of its foreign currency 
reserves that allowed China to “diversify its economic relationships through loans and 
investments in other developing states,” and created a situation in which the international 
community was open to reform of the U.S. backed international economic institutions and 
potentially alteration of the global reserve currency77  
Chinese GDP growth has been exponential over the past three decades, both in 
terms of raw U.S. dollars and in percentage growth rate. This has been driven by the rapid 
increase in Chinese global trade whereas of 2018 it accounted for 12.4% of all global trade, 
with the United States coming in second at 11.5%.78 The massive trade surplus enjoyed 
by China is dominated by its exports to the United States, which consumes almost 20% of 
all Chinese exports.79 China’s total GDP growth in trillions of U.S. dollars and annual year 
on percentage since 1989 are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
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Figure 1. Chinese GDP growth in trillions USD.80 
 
Figure 2. Percentage GDP growth rate: China and U.S.81 
The United States has also experienced a trade deficit with China of over $300 billion 
every year since 2011, with the largest deficit coming in at $345.2 billion in 2019.82 The one-
sided trade imbalance has been singled out as one of a number of economic factors, to include 
allegations of currency manipulation, unfair protection of State-Owned Enterprises, and 
intellectual-property theft, that triggered U.S. economic reprisals in return.83 
 
80 Adapted from: The World Bank Group, “World Development Indicators,” accessed May 1, 2021, 
https://databank.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/1ff4a498/Popular-Indicators#. 
81 Adapted from: The World Bank Group. “World Development Indicators.” 
82 US Census Bureau Foreign Trade Division, “Foreign Trade: Data,” accessed March 1, 2021, 
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html. 




















1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
China United States
34 
b. Shift in Military Power 
In addition to the shift in the economic balance of power in Asia, there has been an 
accompanying shift in the military balance of power between China and the United States. 
Even as early as February of 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense received testimony from 
the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency that placed China at the top of the 
conventional state actors who presented a major military threat in the future.84 The testimony 
included acknowledgement of China’s improvements to its military forces, updated 
technologies, and increased capacity to threaten regional allies and the United States. 
China has made significant improvements and expansions to its military forces over 
the past several decades. Noticeably, the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy 
(PLA(N)) has been significantly expanded from a fleet of approximately 130 ships and 
submarines in the late 1990s to a modernized force of over 335 ships in 2019, surpassing 
that of the United States with 296 vessels.85 While numbers alone cannot adequately depict 
China’s naval power, a 2018 testimony from U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson 
concluded that China was “capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short 
of war with the United States.”86 A list of major PLA(N) combatants and their fleet 
locations is depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Major PLA(N) combatants and locations.87 
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China has also devoted significant energy to the research and development of Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities like the DF-21D medium range ballistic missile. 
This missile uses a maneuverable reentry vehicle to enhance the accuracy and survivability 
of its warhead, which makes it a potent threat to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.88 The 
development of high end naval and missile technology has been enabled by China’s 
growing military budget. China’s defense expenditures have grown every year for the past 
decade and nearly doubled during that time to approximately $174 billion in 2019.89 
However, China’s actual defense budget is speculated to be even higher than officially 
reported due to the lack of transparency in the PRC’s military expenditures. Figure 4 
provides China’s officially reported defense funding and an estimate of actual spending 
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPIRI).  
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Figure 4. PRC defense spending 2011–2019.90 
In lieu of these developments the Department of Defense released a new National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2018, which was the first it has published since 2008.91 The 
new NDS listed China as a “strategic competitor” that was using “military modernization, 
influence operations, and predatory economics …. To reorder the Indo-Pacific to their 
advantage.”92 Furthermore, the NDS acknowledged that the U.S. military no longer held 
an outright advantage in any of its operational domains—sea, air, land, space, or 
cyberspace—with respect to other great powers.93  
The increase in the number of Chinese naval combatants, the development of 
advanced ballistic missiles, and the increase in defense budget compared to the United 
States indicates a relative change in the military balance of power. The United States by 
comparison has seen its number of naval combatants stagnate or decrease, its forces spread 
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thin to cover combat operations across the globe and has dedicated large portions of its 
defense budget to supporting wars in the Middle East. New data from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute indicates that China is catching up to the United 
States in terms of overall size of its arms industry. Based on new information available 
about the production of various Chinese arms manufacturers, China has recently surpassed 
Russia to become the world’s second largest arms producer in the world behind the United 
States.94 The growth of the size and capability of the Chinese military and the growth of 
its defense industry pose the most significant threat to U.S. military supremacy since the 
end of the Cold War. 
c. Expansion of Chinese Soft Power 
Chinese soft power is the PRC’s “ability to influence by persuasion rather than 
coercion,” and is exploited “through various means, including culture, diplomacy, 
participation in multinational organizations, businesses’ actions, and…economic 
strength”.95 Beginning in the 1970s, China experienced a significant increase in the 
number of its official foreign relationships as a result of renewed relations with the United 
States and its entry into the United Nations.96 Figure 5 shows the increase in Chinese 
diplomatic relations between 1950 and 2020, with a significant uptick beginning at 
approximately 1970. During the administrations of Chinese Presidents Hu Jintao and Xi 
Jinping the PRC refocused its diplomatic efforts towards its neighboring countries in East 
and Southeast Asia as well as initiated outreach efforts to much of the developing world.97 
President Xi’s flagship project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was 
announced in 2013 was aimed at increasing China’s soft power influence through massive 
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economic infrastructure and investment projects around the developing world.98 The BRI 
is a mega project involving 138 countries, affecting 61% of the global population, and 
included $6 trillion in trade between BRI countries from 2014 to 2017.99 
 
Figure 5. Official Chinese diplomatic relations.100 
China has also significantly increased its contribution of soldiers to United Nations 
peacekeeping missions around the world over the past two decades. China surged from just 
five UN peacekeepers in 1990 to more than 2,500 in 2020, and in 2017 President Xi created 
an additional reserve force of 8,000 Chinese soldiers earmarked for U.N. peacekeeping 
purposes.101 Figure 6 shows Chinese contributions to United Nations peacekeeping forces.  
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Figure 6. Number of Chinese peacekeepers in thousands.102 
In addition to its economic development and international organization 
participation, China has waged a large global information campaign. China has used its 
vast consumer base, aggressive diplomats, and scores of online netizens to influence and 
win over global public opinion. The large Chinese consumer base can support or ostracize 
corporations and individuals who paint China in an unflattering light, as was seen in the 
2019 resignation of the Houston Rockets general manager following his comments in 
support of the Hong Kong democracy protests.103  
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2. Balance of Power and U.S. Policy 
a. Assessment of Evidence 
Evidence supporting U.S. policy changes as reactions to a balance of power shift 
driven by Chinese growth in Asia is significant and plentiful. The United States has 
adjusted its policies across a broad spectrum of economic, security and diplomatic areas in 
order to maintain global influence. The most often voiced rationale behind these actions—
cited increasingly in government hearings, official press statements, and speeches—is that 
the United States has fallen behind and that China risks displacing the liberal world order 
created and backed by the United States. The U.S. effort to respond to shifts in the global 
balance of power is often overshadowed by the disjointed and inconsistent manner in which 
these policies are enacted as well as changing elected leadership and competing national 
priorities. The South China Sea, with its obvious Chinese influence and future designs, has 
become an easy target for U.S. lawmakers to focus competitive energies on. The potential 
impacts of Chinese control of the South China Sea are seen as exceptionally dire for a status 
quo balanced in favor of the United States. 
In response to the economic, military, and diplomatic changes in the balance of 
power, the United States has taken a series of actions. In 2018, the United States 
simultaneously enacting three rounds of tariffs on China that were worth an estimated $250 
billion, commenced an investigation into alleged Chinese trade infractions, and sanctioned 
trade goods as a part of the Trade Act of 1974.104 The initiation of this trade war was an 
effort by the Trump presidency to protect the United States’ superior economic position by 
competing directly against China’s unfair advantages resulting from its “special and 
differential treatments” as a developing nation.105 This policy shift is an intentional change 
in the U.S.-China economic dynamic from one of tacit cooperation to strategic competition. 
The aim of this being, “to prevent China from threatening U.S. leadership in the world by 
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constraining China’s behavior and economic growth,” by implementing tariffs, limiting 
high-technology exchanges, and limiting Chinese direct investment in the United 
States.106 Besides being focused on maintaining economic preeminence, the trade war was 
reflective of a broader U.S. challenge to the opposing political system in China and the 
associated perceived security threat to U.S. technological and defense supremacy.107  
Less than three months after the February 2002 congressional testimony on the 
growing Chinese military threat, DOD Director of Net Assessment Andy Marshall 
provided the secretary of defense a list of “near-term actions … to put in place the initial 
phase of such a long-term shift in focus” towards the Asia-Pacific.108 Recommendations 
in this memorandum included 1) negotiations for U.S. military basing in northern Australia, 
2) negotiations for increased port facilities and forward basing in Singapore, and 3) more 
military-to-military interaction with India.109 Notably, the recommendations include 
updating unified campaign plans to “reflect China as principle long-term strategic 
competitor” and to “increase the focus on China … in Service and Joint wargaming.”110 
In November 2015, then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Defense 
Innovation Initiative (DII), which was described as a “department-wide initiative to pursue 
innovative ways to sustain and advance … military superiority for the 21st Century,” and 
cautioned against future adversaries who had been modernizing and creating capabilities 
aimed to overcome U.S. military advantages.111 In a speech given on the same day, 
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Secretary Hagel described the need for the Defense Innovation Initiative in light of Chinese 
advancements in “fielding advanced aircraft, submarines, and both longer range and more 
accurate missiles” that threatened U.S. military superiority in the Asia-Pacific.112 The 
entire premise of this effort was to re-orient military operations, technology, and 
deployments away from a legacy Middle Eastern land war focus in order to counter what 
was realized to be a closing gap between Chinese military capabilities and U.S. military 
supremacy. The major policy shift in this case revolved around the idea of civil-military 
fusion. Instead of Department of Defense reliance on government research and 
development, the DII aimed to bring civilian innovation into the military workspace similar 
to how the PRC incorporated civilian ingenuity into its military enterprise. 
On 1 February 2018, the DOD created a new position of Undersecretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering (USD for R&E) as part of a reorganization effort aimed at 
maintaining the U.S. military’s technological edge.113 In congressional testimony on 18 
April 2018, Dr. Michael Griffin, the new USD for R&E, acknowledged that his position 
had been created because of the “erosion of U.S. technological superiority” and that his job 
was aimed at rapidly prototyping and testing high-end technologies in order to maintain an 
edge over near peer competitors.114 Dr. Griffin went on to elaborate that his new 
department was created in direct response to China’s growing advantage in hypersonic-
weapons, anti-access and area denial (A2/AD), and its ability to rapidly develop high-end 
military technology faster than the United States.115 
Examples of U.S. reactions to Chinese soft power growth include efforts to renew 
and expand alliance interactions with the Philippines, U.S. support for Japanese Self 
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Defense Force Expansion, and the re-engagement of the U.S.-India-Japan-Australia 
quadrilateral engagement otherwise known as the Quad. 
In April of 2014, the U.S. and Philippine governments signed the Enhanced 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which aimed to make closer security 
engagements between the two countries possible and would “support the alliance and 
promote peace and security in the region.”116 According to international relations and 
security expert Renato Cruz De Castro, the creation of the EDCA was “designed to 
constrain China” and serve as a “high-profile way of demonstrating American strategic 
clout in the region.”117 One year later, in April 2015, the United States and Japan 
promulgated new guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.118 This was the first 
time since 1997 that the guidelines for the U.S.-Japan alliance had been updated, and 
although China was not directly named, the update intended to create closer defense 
capabilities between Japan and the United States given increasing Chinese regional 
influence.119 The State Department claimed that the updated guidelines promoted “a more 
balanced and effective Alliance to meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st 
century.”120 In this case, the State Department’s wording infers a veiled reference to 
Chinese power as part of the security challenges concerned. 
The United States also responded to the PRC’s all-of-government belt and road 
initiative which is viewed as a strategic threat because it increases “Chinese leverage to 
shape partner nations’ preferences, edge out U.S. influence, and expand Chinese military 
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presence.”121 In 2017, the U.S. government re-started the “Quad” dialogue between the 
United States, India, Australia, and Japan and created the Indo-Pacific strategic concept in 
order to challenge China through “1) strategic extension, 2) regional economic cooperation, 
and 3) protection of regional vital interests.”122 Although the Quad was primarily initiated 
as a “strategic consultative mechanism,” the dialogue group has value in signaling that 
“like-minded states have an alternative to succumbing to the allure of BRI.”123 
b. Application to U.S. Policy Change on Sovereignty  
The Obama administrations subtle changes to the United States’ South China Sea 
sovereignty policy are best explained as results of a shifting balance of power with China. 
According to author Nina Silove, the aim of Obama’s rebalance to Asia “was to dissuade 
China from making a bid for hegemony and thereby preserve the existing power balance 
in the region, in which the United States held the superior position.”124 The reallocation 
of military forces to the Pacific Ocean area, and efforts to increase defense innovation are 
characterized by Silove as “internal balancing” factors done by the United States to 
increase its military capabilities in the Pacific in response to China’s increased military 
strength.125 Obama administration moves such as support for Philippines arbitration, 
deployment of Marines to Australia, and basing of Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore can 
be categorized as “external balancing” factors because they were aimed at strengthening 
bilateral relationships with friendly nations in Asia at the expense of Chinese influence.126 
In addition to military changes, the Obama administration also pursued economic and 
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diplomatic engagement of China in the form of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was 
touted as part of the rebalance aimed at integrating China into the existing international 
order.127 While these efforts were driven by an expanding Chinese power, the Obama 
administration hesitated to outright declare a side in the South China Sea sovereignty issue. 
In an effort to continue working with China, the Obama administration avoided creating 
additional contention around this issue that would have resulted from an outright policy 
change. 
On July 13, 2020, the United States issued its most striking policy update on the 
topic of South China Sea sovereignty claims to date. In a political first, the United States 
explicitly broke with its previous policy of neutrality on the merits of any individual claims 
and spoke out directly against the PRC’s legal claims to the South China Sea.128 The 
statement called China’s claims illegal and its behavior bullying while also expressing 
American solidarity with its Southeast Asian allies and the international community in 
upholding international law. There are indications that this change is related to a larger 
effort to stop a change in the balance of power relative to the PRC. First, in the immediate 
aftermath of Secretary Pompeo’s announcement that China’s claims were unlawful, 
Assistant Secretary Stillwell delivered a telling speech that underlined the motivations for 
the Trump administration’s policy statement. Second, although this policy statement is 
bold and direct in its clarification of the U.S. position with respect to Chinese claims, it is 
really the next step in a set of precedents began under the Obama administration that breaks 
from the historical position of neutrality. According to Gregory Poling, a senior fellow at 
CSIS, the policy change made a significant diplomatic impact because, by making its 
position explicit, the United States leveled a blow to China by calling its actions illegal and 
endeared itself to Asian allies by taking a stand that is not explicitly self-interested.129 
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On 14 July, 2020, David Stilwell, the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, delivered an address for the Center for Strategic and International Studies during 
which he outlined the manyfold reasons for the Trump administration’s strengthening of 
its policy regarding the South China Sea.130 The first rationale provided by Stilwell was 
that the United States desired to see a “free and open Indo-Pacific” where “no hegemonic 
power dominates others or turns international waters into a zone of exclusion.”131 The 
discussion of hegemonic power indicates that the growth of Chinese regional pre-eminence 
weighed heavily in the minds of those who drafted this policy change. Stilwell continued 
to highlight growing U.S. partnerships across Southeast Asia and increasing collaboration 
with allied nations, all of which were aimed “to keep the peace.”132 He also referenced the 
significant commercial investments that the United States had with ASEAN countries and 
claimed that they were directly responsible for the increasing quality of life in Southeast 
Asia. This part of Stillwell’s discussion appears aimed at providing evidence for the key 
role that U.S. economic power still plays in Asia. Furthermore, it appears to show a 
preoccupation of policymakers with maintaining U.S. economic preeminence in Asia. 
Revealingly, Stilwell directly described Beijing’s transition from a position as a limited 
rising power to a neo-imperialist country that “wants to dominate its immediate 
neighborhood—and eventually impose its will and its rules” on all of its neighbors.133  
The 13 July policy change also achieved bi-partisan support in Congress. On the 
same day the policy change was made, a group of Democratic and Republican senators 
declared their full support for “the administration’s decision to clarify the United States’ 
position that China’s territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea are unlawful,” 
indicating that the move had significant governmental support and may not have just been 
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a timely stunt by one administration.134 Based on the wide-ranging negative implications 
for Chinese interests resulting from policy, it appears to be part of a larger aim at checking 
China’s regional pre-eminence. 
The United States began the changes that led to the 13 July break almost a decade 
before, and the trend of those previous actions also appears to mark the U.S. move as a 
response to Chinese growth in military and diplomatic power. The United States’ 
statements in 2010 by Secretary Clinton to ASEAN urging all claimants to clarify their 
positions was a direct response to ambiguous Chinese legal claims to the South China 
Sea.135 In 2014, the United States also tacitly supported Philippine and Vietnamese legal 
arbitration to the permanent court of arbitration, and applauded the tribunal’s award which 
legally negated Chinese claims in 2016.136 It was also under the Obama administration 
that Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), which sail U.S. Navy ships through 
contested maritime claims, were restarted.  
c. Application to U.S. Policy Change on the U.S.–Philippines MDT 
On March 1, 2019, during a State Department press availability with the Philippine 
Foreign Secretary, Secretary of State Pompeo declared that “any armed attack on 
Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual 
defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”137 This statement was 
surprising and unexpected given that the provisions of the MDT had lasted for decades 
without any clarification as to whether the U.S. military alliance would cover the 
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Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. The timing and events surrounding this 
statement seem to indicate that the policy change was based on U.S. desires to strengthen 
its relationship with the Philippines and show the seriousness of its alliance partnerships in 
Asia.  
Similar to the start of the U.S. trade war in 2018, the U.S. policy change in 2019 
was proceeded by a series of political and military events that appeared to be tipping the 
balance of power in Asia towards China. The U.S.–Philippines relationship had suffered 
following the 2012 standoff between the Chinese and Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, 
where the Chinese ended up with de facto control at the expense of the Philippines. In a 
first since the closing of Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the 1990s, the 
United States moved in 2014 to re-invigorate its security ties in the Philippines via the 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which would allow U.S. forces to use certain 
Philippine installations for operations.138 Positive progress came to a halt in 2016 when 
the Philippines elected President Rodrigo Duterte. Duterte was not hesitant to disavow 
U.S.-Philippine ties and move to enhance commercial and economic linkages with the 
PRC. The U.S. policy clarification is likely to have been a move to sweeten the relationship 
between Manila and Washington when the Philippines’ location in the South China Sea 
became more strategically important. 
Secretary Pompeo’s speech was vague as to why the policy was being clarified after 
several decades of ambiguity, but its language did appear to indicate a desire to sway 
Philippine public opinion in favor of the United States and at the expense of China. Pompeo 
alluded to U.S. commitments to freedom of navigation, the Indo-Pacific concept, U.S.–
Philippines economic partnership, and the benefits of U.S. commercial transparency as 
opposed to Chinese opacity.139 In a follow up interview with ABS-CBN news, Secretary 
Pompeo elaborated that his statements on the MDT were also intended to assure the 
Philippines that the United States intended to “make sure that every country in the region 
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has the opportunity” to freely use the trade routes in the South China Sea, and make their 
own sovereign decisions free from outside pressure.140  
C. EXAMINATION OF THE PRC-ASSERTIVENESS EXPLANATION 
The second explanation for U.S. policy changes is that they are reactions arising 
from specific instances of Chinese activity. In this case U.S. foreign policy activity is 
reactive in that the PRC behaved belligerently and the United States acted after the fact in 
order to showcase its regional investment and importance. This section will be focused on 
outlining direct connections between Chinese actions, statements, or activity that had a 
negative impact on U.S. ambitions or policy positions, and subsequent U.S. responses. Key 
to supporting this explanation is evidence of timing between any actions and reactions, 
U.S. leaders indicating that follow on actions are being done in direct response to certain 
activities, and official moves to retaliate. 
There is a history of increasingly risky interactions between the PRC and the United 
States in security, economic and diplomatic fronts over the past twelve years. Of these 
interactions it has been Chinese military activity that has garnered the most exacting and 
unsympathetic responses from western media and the U.S. defense establishment. As the 
Chinese military expanded its naval fleets and air forces there have been increasing 
numbers of altercations between them and the various regional U.S. military units. In its 
effort to regain past prestige China has often behaved in a heavy-handed manner that 
appears to display arrogance, disinterest in international rules and norms, and an apparent 
desire to test the boundaries of the international community’s patience. Therefore, the 
United States has been forced to adjust its policies because of a need to save face, live up 
to its responsibility as the arbiter of world peace, and act as a balance to China’s increasing 
regional weight. 
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a. Responses to Military Interactions 
On 8 March 2009, the civilian-operated hydrographic survey ship USNS 
Impeccable, operating 75 nautical miles south of Hainan Island and well outside territorial 
waters, was surrounded by multiple Chinese fishing vessels and harassed.141 This was the 
most serious international incident between Chinese and U.S. military craft since the 2001 
Hainan Island EP-3 incident and it marked a new trend in provocative Chinese harassment 
actions that appeared aimed at intimidating and exercising unlawful authorities on the high 
seas. The initial response to this harassment was limited, because on 11 and 12 March 2009 
the Chinese foreign minister met for the first time with the newly appointed U.S. secretary 
of state and national security advisor on a prearranged. The incident was apparently 
discussed between the parties and afterwards the United States responded in a non-
provocative manner by ordering the USS Chung Hoon, an Arleigh Burke class destroyer, 
to escort the Impeccable back into its operating area off the Chinese coast.142 Details of 
the meeting between Chinese and U.S. officials are scarce, but post-event press briefings 
seemed to indicate that the U.S. response was muted because the issue had been discussed 
at length during internal meetings between both governments and a satisfactory explanation 
was provided by the Chinese for their behavior. 
On 5 December, 2013 a PLA(N) warship nearly collided with the USS Cowpens in 
an attempt to prevent it from operating near a PRC naval task force in the South China 
Sea.143 Following this, then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Commander of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey spoke out against the Chinese, calling the behavior 
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irresponsible but taking no further diplomatic action or military measures.144 As in the 
case with the USNS Impeccable, there was little to no direct U.S. retaliatory action 
following the Cowpens near-collision. It would be a year to-the-day until the U.S. 
government was to respond generally to the Chinese, and then it was in relation to their 
island building campaign in the South China Sea. On 5 December 2014, in a response to 
the increasing belligerence of Chinese naval vessels and island building, the United States 
released a detailed technical analysis of “the maritime claims People’s Republic of China 
in the South China Sea”.145 The report outlined the confusion surrounding China’s claims 
and was the first time that the United States openly discussed and outlined its issues with 
China’s expressed maritime boundaries. In 2015 the United States resumed Freedom of 
Navigation Operations (FONOPS) against disputed maritime claims in the South China 
Sea.  
At the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
categorized China’s South China Sea activity as being in opposition to U.S. interests. 
Secretary Mattis cited that “China’s militarization of artificial features in the South China 
Sea includes the deployment of anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic 
jammers, and more recently, the landing of bomber aircraft at Woody Island,” and was “in 
direct contradiction to President Xi’s 2015 public assurances in the White House Rose 
Garden that they would not do this.”146 According to Secretary Mattis, it was because of 
China’s trend in behavior that the United States chose to disinvite the PLA(N) from the 
2018 Rim of the Pacific Naval Exercise.147 During the following year the U.S. Navy 
conducted more Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPS) than in any year since the 
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U.S. resumed FONOPS in 2015, with the Navy conducting six in 2017, five in 2018, and 
nine in 2019.148 The linkage between Chinese provocations and U.S. reactions explicitly 
mentioned in Secretary Mattis’ speech show that the U.S. was taking responsive measures 
to a broad range of undesirable Chinese activity and the increase in FONOPS was most 
likely an additive measure to show U.S. displeasure with Chinese activity in the South 
China Sea. 
b. Scarborough Shoal and Land Reclamation Campaign in South China 
Sea  
In the spring of 2012, units of the Chinese and Philippine coast guards engaged in 
a prolonged two-month stand-off over the control of Scarborough Shoal, a maritime feature 
inside the Philippines claimed exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea.149 
Because of the threat of armed conflict between the Chinese and the Philippines over the 
Shoal, the United States increased publicity surrounding port-visits for forward deployed 
fast attack submarines to Subic Bay in an effort to demonstrate U.S. resolve to supporting 
its defense obligations to the Philippines.150 The United States was involved in negotiating 
an end to the standoff, with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying and U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State Kurt Campbell agreeing that both Chinese and Philippine forces would 
leave Scarborough Shoal simultaneously.151 However, the Chinese failed to ensure that 
their ships left the area, which created an impression that the combined U.S.–Philippines 
reaction to the stand-off was weak and failed to sufficiently block Chinese territorial 
ambitions. 
 
148 David Larter, “In Challenging China’s Claims in the South China Sea, the US Navy Is Getting 
More Assertive,” Defense News, February 18, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/02/05/in-
challenging-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-the-us-navy-is-getting-more-assertive/. 
149 Renato Cruz de Castro, “Facing Up to China’s Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea 
Dispute: The Case of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Stand-off and Its Aftermath,” Journal of Asian Security 
and International Affairs 3, no. 2 (August 1, 2016): 168, https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016645452. 
150 Cruz de Castro, 173. 
151 Michael Green et al., “Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff,” Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative (blog), May 22, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/. 
54 
In March of 2016, President Obama reacted to Chinese designs to conduct 
additional land reclamation in and around the contested Scarborough Shoal. He delivered 
such a harsh reproach and warning against such activity that Chinese paramilitary and 
fishing vessels temporarily left the area.152 According to U.S. intelligence officials, there 
were indications that the People’s Liberation Army had been strongly advocating to 
consolidate control over the feature after three years of waiting following the 2012 stand-
off with the Philippine Navy. According to former White House Asia advisor Evan 
Mederios, President Obama made it clear to President Xi that attempts to start land 
reclamation on Scarborough Shoal would conflict with U.S. interests and severely risk the 
possibility of military intervention.153 President Obama’s warnings to the PRC were 
followed up with a military show of force which included a flight of A-10 Warthog close 
air support aircraft conducting flights near the disputed features. 
c. PRC-Vietnam Naval/Fishing Standoffs 
On May 1, 2014, the PRC sent the deep-ocean oil drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981, 
multiple oil exploration vessels, and a small flotilla of smaller craft into Vietnamese 
claimed waters in the vicinity of a potential oil field previously mapped by the 
Vietnamese.154 The move immediately provoked a tense standoff during which ships on 
both sides behaved in highly aggressive manners. Six days after the standoff, the U.S. State 
Department issued a press-release which called Chinese actions “provocative” and “part of 
a broader pattern of Chinese behavior to advance its claims over disputed territory in a 
manner that undermines peace and stability in the region.”155 One day later, on May 8, 
2014, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Russel, 
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held a press conference at the U.S. embassy in Hanoi where he emphasized the need for 
the various territorial claims in the South China Sea to be addressed in a manner “fully 
consistent with international law” and expressed a desire for restraint to be used by both 
sides.156 On October 2, 2014, the United States eased its arms embargo policy with 
Vietnam in what was viewed as a move “to help Hanoi strengthen its maritime security as 
it contends with a more assertive China.”157 This policy shift was significant in that it was 
the first time in 40 years that the United States eased its embargo on selling lethal weapons 
to Vietnam, and it marked a new emphasis on strengthening United States security ties with 
Vietnam.158 
In mid-July of 2019 the Chinese and Vietnamese were embroiled in another 
standoff between oil exploration and coastguard vessels, resulting in Chinese ships 
maneuvering in a hostile manner towards the Vietnamese in disputed waters claimed by 
both countries.159 In response, the U.S. State Department released a strongly worded 
statement on China’s interference with foreign gas and oil exploration projects and called 
Chinese actions a threat and a disruption of regional security while imploring China to 
“cease its bullying behavior and refrain from engaging in this type of provocative and 
destabilizing activity.”160 
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d. 2020 Pandemic South China Sea Actions 
In the first six months of 2020 following the start of the coronavirus pandemic, 
China instigated a series of provocative measures in the South China Sea which resulted in 
a variety of U.S. diplomatic and military responses. On February 17, 2020 a PLA(N) 
warship targeted a Republic of the Philippines Navy corvette with its fire control system 
while both were operating in the Spratly Islands.161 In March of 2020, the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences activated two new research stations on Yongshu and Zhubi reefs—
also known as Fiery Cross and Subi reefs—in the Spratly Islands which were ostensibly 
for conducting ecological, geological and oceanographic studies even though those 
outposts were already heavily fortified for military use.162 At the beginning of April 2020, 
a Vietnamese fishing boat was rammed and sunk by a Chinese People’s Armed Forces 
Maritime Militia (PAFMM) vessel while sailing in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands. This 
prompted a statement from the U.S. Department of State which declared the United States’ 
concerns with the incident and called it “the latest in a long string of PRC actions to assert 
unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South 
China Sea.”163 In mid-April, new administrative zones were proclaimed by the Chinese 
Ministry of Civil Affairs in the South China Sea which placed overall control of the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands under China’s Hainan Province government.164 
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2. Chinese Assertiveness and U.S. Policy 
a. Assessment of Evidence 
The evidence supporting U.S. policy changes as reactions to specific Chinese 
behaviors or behavioral patterns in the South China Sea is mixed. The number of negative 
military and diplomatic interactions between the PRC, the United States and other 
Southeast Asian countries has increased significantly since the well publicized 2009 USNS 
Impeccable incident. Many of these interactions appear to incite a short-term military 
activity, written statements, or verbal protests by the U.S. Department of Defense or 
Department of State. However, it is challenging to link individual behaviors to specific 
response policies, especially given the naturally veiled decision-making nature of both 
domestic and international politics. Other factors, such as long-term diplomatic or military 
planning may have as significant an impact on an individual response as do the unique 
details inherent to a particular international incident or Chinese action. Additionally, it is 
difficult to discern whether or not Chinese actions may themselves be a response to what 
is perceived as a slight on the part of the United States. Determining which side may play 
the role of sparking the initial crisis is a difficult task given the now decades-long ongoing 
escalation in the South China Sea. The overall trend appears to indicate that, as Chinese 
behavior has escalated in belligerence over the past twelve years, the United States has 
responded more frequently and with increasing vigor to individual instances that appear to 
cross unofficial red lines or are detrimental to perceptions of U.S. regional dedication.  
b. Application to Sovereignty Policy Change  
There is strong evidence to indicate that Chinese assertive activity was a major 
driver for the sovereignty policy change made by the United States. The Obama 
administration was surprisingly patient in its slow adjustment of its sovereignty policy 
position given the numerous hostile military and diplomatic actions undertaken by the PRC 
between 2008 and 2016. While it is challenging to directly link individual Chinese actions 
to piecemeal changes in the sovereignty policy under the Obama administration, it is likely 
that China’s relatively consistent aggressive behavior encouraged the U.S. administration 
to continue its departure from the sovereignty policy precedent established in the 1990s. 
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However, the global context of such behavior in 2019 and 2020 incited a direct response 
from the United States. According to Felix Chang, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, the United States’ policy change was most likely attributable to 
“China’s history of opportunism in the South China Sea: the fear that Beijing will take 
advantage of a world distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic to further expand its presence 
in the region.”165 In December 2019, the Chinese chose to initiate another standoff 
between the Chinese survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8 and the Malaysian oil exploration ship 
West Capella which lasted for six months. This coincided with the PRC’s hostile 
interactions towards both the Philippines in February, its March move to christen new 
research stations, and its April attack on the Vietnamese fishing vessel and attempts to 
increase administrative control of South China Seas features.  
The long string of provocative actions in 2020 appears to have caused a series of 
U.S. reactions, a major piece of which was the policy change. In response to the Chinese 
harassment activities the United States chose to exert a significant show of military force. 
A international naval force consisting of multiple U.S. and Australian warships, 
accompanied by F-35 fighter aircraft, moved into the oil exploration area to conduct joint 
peacetime operations.166 Close on their heels came both of the forward deployed U.S. 
littoral combat ships from Singapore and several flights of B-1 bombers from Guam and 
the continental United States over the next week.167 At the height of the crisis in May 
2020, the U.S. Pacific Fleet announced that “every one of its forward-deployed 
submarines” were “conducting contingency response operations…in support of a free and 
open Indo-Pacific region.”168 This was an unusual announcement in that normally 
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clandestine submarine operations were spoken of in a manner which indicated they were 
responding to the Chinese activities in the South China Sea.169 On July 4, 2020, the U.S. 
deployed two carrier strike groups, the USS Nimitz and the USS Ronald Reagan, to the 
South China Sea to conduct exercises in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands.170 These same 
carrier strike groups would return to the South China Sea just two weeks later in another 
show of force, this time responding to a deployment of Chinese fighter aircraft to the 
Paracel Islands.171  
The July 13, 2020, policy change made by Secretary Pompeo comes close on the 
heels of this significant number of Chinese actions in the South China Sea that were either 
aggressive or belligerent in nature. The proximity of his statement to and association with 
Chinese activity, which was also happening at the height of the global coronavirus 
pandemic makes it highly likely that it was caused by Chinese actions. It seems too 
coincidental that the announcement occurred during a year when the coronavirus outbreak 
significantly increased suspicions of China, the PRC had enacted controversial national 
security laws in Hong Kong, and U.S. military forces were operationally hampered by the 
outbreak. According to Robert D. Williams, a senior research scholar and law lecturer at 
Yale Law School, the Trump administration appeared pressed to act in response to 
“China’s latest South China Sea moves by demonstrating resolve, showing support for 
Southeast Asian allies and partners frustrated by Chinese bullying.”172 The timing of the 
policy change relative to the slew of Chinese activities strongly indicates that it was driven 
by these events. 
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c. Application to U.S.–Philippines MDT Change  
Evidence supporting the change in U.S.–Philippines MDT applicability as a result 
of specific Chinese activities is difficult to directly correlate. The U.S. policy statement 
came at a time when U.S.-Philippine bilateral relations were challenged by personality 
politics of their respective administrations, and the historically close partnership was 
overshadowed by an apparently closer relationship between Manila and Beijing. Any 
indications in Secretary Pompeo’s statement alluding to specific causes for the change are 
vague. The speech did briefly reference the threat of Chinese “island-building and military 
activities” as threatening Philippines “sovereignty, security, and therefore economic 
livelihood,” but did not directly indicate this as the impetus for the United States’ newfound 
dedication to apply force in support of the Philippines in the South China Sea.173  
Close to the timing of the statement, the Chinese did controversially engage the 
Philippines over a land reclamation and expansion project that occurred on a Philippines 
occupied island. The aggressive nature of the Chinese response to Philippine activity, 
which harkened back to PRC actions around Scarborough Shoal, could have served as a 
factor in prompting the U.S. statement. Beginning in December of 2018, dozens of Chinese 
PAFMM and civilian fishing vessels used swarm tactics to harass Philippines military and 
civilian contractors conducting a runway extension project on the Philippines occupied 
Thitu Island.174 Similar swarming tactics using multiple civilian or militia fishing vessels 
were used extensively during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff which resulted in a 
strategic loss of face for the Philippine armed forces who were ultimately not able to 
prevent Chinese craft from blocking access to the shoal. Concerns that the standoff could 
lead to a military confrontation between the Philippines and China, and the Chinese use of 
intimidation tactics to prevent an activity that they themselves had previously engaged in, 
may have contributed to the policy clarification by the United States. 
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In the absence of clearer evidence of specific Chinese behavior inciting the U.S.–
Philippines MDT policy update there are other possible causes for the policy change. In 
December of 2018, the Republic of the Philippines Defense Secretary, Delfin Lorenzana 
called for a comprehensive review of the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty with the 
end goal being “to maintain it, strengthen it, or scrap it.”175 Because this announcement 
had significant potential ramifications for the continuation of all U.S. alliance activities 
with the Philippines, to include the VFA and the EDCA, it appears that actions by the 
Philippine government may have played a role in prompting the clarification of the U.S. 
position with respect to Philippine concerns in the South China Sea. Because the next 
chapter of this thesis will address the role played by allied and partner nations in 
influencing U.S. policy positions further analysis of the role played by the Philippines in 
causing the MDT policy change will be addressed later.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to provide insight as to why the United States changed its 
stances on both South China Sea sovereignty and the U.S.–Philippines MDT by examining 
two China-centric explanations. The first explanation was that the United States’ policy change 
was a reaction to a changing balance of power with China. The balance of power explanation 
shows that the United States altered its position on the South China Sea territorial issues in 
response to a changing economic, military, and diplomatic balance-of-power with the PRC. 
The balance of power explanation also provides an answer as to why the U.S. clarified its MDT 
applicability with the Philippines in 2019. Official policy statements and timing of U.S. actions 
show that it was advantageous for the United States to recommit itself to its defense obligations 
to the Philippines. This policy shift allowed the United States to bolster its influence with the 
Philippines at the expense of China given the strategically important location of the Philippines 
between North and Southeast Asia.  
The second explanation was that the U.S. policy changes were reactions to instances 
of Chinese belligerent activity. There is ample evidence of hostile ship-to-ship interactions, 
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island building, fishing standoffs, and other provocations which support the change in U.S. 
position on South China Sea territorial issues as a response to increasing instances of 
belligerent Chinese activity. The Obama administration observed this power shift and started 
maneuvering U.S. policy to respond slow and subtle fashion. During the Trump presidency in 
2020, reinvigorated Chinese provocations sparked the need for a more distinct stance. 
However, I find that there is not adequate evidence of triggering activities on the part of the 
PRC to explain why the United States chose to clarify the applicability of its Mutual Defense 
Treaty in 2019. In the lead up to that policy shift there were dozens of instances of Chinese 
belligerence towards the Philippines that resulted in little or no response on the part of the 
United States.   
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IV. THE ROLE OF ALLIES AND PARTNER NATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Explanations for U.S. policy changes regarding both the South China Sea 
sovereignty issue and the U.S.–Philippines MDT can be overshadowed by Chinese power 
and influence, but allies and partners also play a critical role for the United States. This 
chapter introduces and examines the evidence in support of an ally and partner driven 
explanation for U.S. policy changes. The motivations and goals of other Asian nations, 
specifically those either allied or partnered with the United States, might impact the 
execution of U.S. foreign policy. In this case, allied nations include South Korea, Japan, 
and the Philippines, all of whom benefit from formal defense agreements with the United 
States. Partner nations include those who have either strong defense ties or formal security 
relationships with the United States such as Australia, Singapore, Vietnam, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. This explanation differs from those of the previous chapter because it 
hypothesizes that the impetus for U.S. policy change comes from foreign policy tactics and 
political pressure exerted by countries in an effort to manage U.S. regional involvement in 
Asia.  
This chapter will analyze evidence which supports the role played by allied and 
partner nations in influencing U.S. foreign policy in Asia. I will provide background, 
discuss substantiating evidence, and then apply the explanation to U.S. foreign policy 
actions regarding sovereignty and the U.S.–Philippines MDT. As in the previous chapter, 
I will conclude with an evaluation of the strength of this explanation and the implications 
for U.S. involvement in the South China Sea.  
I find that the U.S.–Philippines MDT policy change was largely influenced by the 
behavior of the Philippines government in the years and months leading up to it. The 
Duterte administration has used an aggressive foreign policy rhetoric to threaten the United 
States with the loss of access to locations key to its efforts to combat Chinese expansionism 
in the South China Sea. However, it is not possible to point to similar evidence showing 
that the shift in the neutral U.S. policy on South China Sea sovereignty was caused by the 
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intervention of other ally or partner countries. There are too many competing interests 
between the multitude of claimant nations and a general wariness among Southeast Asian 
countries towards involving additional superpowers in the dispute. 
B. EXAMINATION OF THE ALLIES-AND-PARTNERS EXPLANATION  
1. Application of Explanation to Broader U.S.-Asia Strategic 
Involvement 
The allies-and-partners explanation postulates that the United States has adjusted 
its policy stances because of direct and indirect pressure from ally and partner countries. 
Evidence of direct pressure includes records of official meetings, statements, and actions 
made by a country with the intent of driving U.S. policy to align with their regional 
interests. Indirect pressure would be similar evidence that indicates a U.S. ally or partner 
is behaving with similar intent to align U.S. policy with their interests but is doing so in a 
subtle or covert manner. This section will use examples of foreign pressure to highlight the 
extent to which U.S. policy has been affected by its various Asian partners and allies. 
The important role played by U.S. alliances has been under increased scrutiny over 
the last two decades, particularly during the four years of the Trump administration when 
U.S. foreign policy rhetoric became less conciliatory towards alliance relationships. The 
United States has historically used a network of strong bilateral alliance relationships in 
Asia to further its foreign policy designs, due in large part to a historical Asian aversion to 
externally driven foreign organizations, such as NATO, in the region. Because no 
multinational security organization has successfully survived in Southeast Asia, it is vitally 
important for the U.S. government and its Asia policymakers to engender strong bonds 
with its bilateral partners in order to meet its regional economic, security, and diplomacy 
goals.176 Similarly, the United States is the only nation present in Asia that can offer 
smaller countries a means to “secure their sovereignty against coercion.”177 This means 
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that Asian allies and partners have much to gain by steering U.S. policy to a place where it 
aligns with their interests. Accordingly, these countries can influence U.S. policy from a 
position of strength since America has to “contend with entrenched narratives of the U.S. 
role in the region oscillating between extremes of neglect or over-militarization.”178 As 
long as the United States focuses its attention on maintaining its influence in Asia, it will 
need the assistance of allies and partners, especially given the region’s importance to 
American foreign policy designs. 
2. Role of Allies and Partners 
The United States has relied heavily on bilateral relationships in Asia to meet its 
foreign policy goals. Of the existing bilateral relationships, those with Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, and the Philippines are particularly strong due primarily due to the security 
benefits experienced by both sides. The most valuable of these security benefits is the 
military protection offered to these countries by the United States and the reciprocal basing 
and support infrastructure provided in return. 
The U.S. relationship with Japan is potentially the strongest bilateral relationship 
in Asia. The relationship was founded on the influence of the United States in crafting 
Japan’s post-war economic recovery, government reform, and social stability. Japan is host 
to seven major U.S. military installations, 4,000 military personnel, shares use of 
significant U.S. military resources, and is indispensable as a regional ally.179 Because of 
the important role Japan plays as a forward basing location for military assets, Japan has 
significant sway in the direction that U.S. foreign policy takes.  
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Behind Japan, South Korea is the second largest overseas location for U.S. troops 
in Asia with over 28,000 stationed in country.180 The Korean peninsula is the only place 
in mainland Asia with the permanent basing of U.S. forces, and given the immediate threat 
posed by a nuclear armed North Korea it is extremely advantageous for the United States 
to be able to place forces close in proximity as a stabilizing presence. In light of an 
increasingly powerful China, South Korea’s alliance with America and its strategic 
location give the country a significance far larger than its small geographic size would 
indicate. Because of this, the South Korean government holds influence over the direction 
of U.S. policy on the peninsula.  
Both Australia and Singapore have close relationships with the United States, and 
although neither have specific claims to disputed features in the South China Sea, they 
benefit from U.S. regional presence and interest. They also are strategically important 
based on their locations in the vicinity of major transit points such as the Strait of Malacca 
and key entry paths into the South China Sea such as the Lombok and Sunda straits. 
Australia is a member of the Five Eyes information sharing arrangement and host to 
forward-deployed Marine forces. Singapore has allowed the forward deployment of U.S. 
littoral combat ships and has built one of the only piers capable of servicing a U.S. Navy 
aircraft carrier. The consistent support of these two countries is vital to the United States’ 
ability to project power across the entire Indo-pacific region. 
The U.S.- Philippine bilateral relationship is complex and has gone through varying 
highs and lows. While the government in power may not always see eye-to-eye with 
Washington, the Philippines holds more influence in American foreign policy than may 
meet the eye. Like Japan and South Korea, the Philippine archipelago dominates all of the 
eastern access channels into the South China Sea, making its geography strategically 
valuable. The Philippines is also linked to the United States by virtue of its long colonial 
and territorial history. For decades, the United States directly administered the Philippines 
and thousands of Filipinos have family ties to America and have served in U.S. armed 
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forces. Most recently, the Philippines has increased in geostrategic importance because it 
often finds itself on the front lines of great power competition between the United States 
and China in the South China Sea. This confluence of factors can be used to the advantage 
of the Philippine government in influencing U.S. foreign policy. 
The United States has worked hard to reinforce its access to Philippine military 
bases and strengthen ties with its military forces. In part this is because the United States 
has a vested interest in ensuring that the Philippines can at least marginally withstand PRC 
pressure given that America has a commitment to protect the Philippines under its 
MDT.181 Because the Philippine armed forces are often underprepared and underequipped 
to perform the tasks given to them by the central government without foreign assistance, 
senior Philippine military leaders have a vested interest in ensuring access to U.S. 
assistance.182 A friendly relationship with Manila also benefits U.S. interests because it 
provides the United States military access to ports and airfields from which it can sortie 
forces for operations in and around the South China Sea. 
3. Allies, Partners and U.S. Policy Change 
a. Assessment of Evidence 
There is ample evidence in the last two decades which supports the idea that allies 
and partners exert influence over the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In examining the 
bilateral relationships with the countries mentioned in section two, there are multiple 
examples of U.S. foreign policy shifting to accommodate foreign needs and desires in order 
to advance and maintain its regional influence and power.  
Two examples of Japanese influence on U.S. foreign policy include the movement 
of Marine Corps forces out of Okinawa and the assurances of U.S. politicians that the U.S.-
Japan MDT will apply to the disputed Senkaku Islands. In the case of U.S. Marine Corps 
forces stationed at Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, consistent pressure from local elites 
in Okinawa and the degradation of public support for the bases has caused the United States 
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to relocate Marine ground forces to Guam.183 U.S. forces in Okinawa had been at the 
center of a number of well publicized incidents with the local population, and such behavior 
put Japanese goodwill towards U.S. presence in the rest of Japan at risk. Ignoring Japanese 
demands was risky because it placed the ability to keep the remainder of U.S. forces 
stationed in Japan under strain. Following a series of agreements in 2006, the U.S. 
government conceded to Japanese requests to relocate the Marine bases either off island or 
to less populated areas of Okinawa.184 
The Senkaku Island dispute is another piece of evidence which supports the 
effectiveness of indirect Japanese influence on U.S. foreign policy. Between both the 
Obama and Trump administrations, the United States consistently confirmed that the U.S.-
Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese administered Senkaku Islands.185 
The United States reiterated its support because of growing Japanese concern “about 
China’s increasing maritime presence near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, through which 
Beijing seeks to erode Japan’s administrative control.”186 When Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe was elected in 2012, Japan was focused on bolstering its security relationship with the 
United States in order to manage tensions with China and increase its own military 
capability.187 Prior to President Obama’s 2014 assertion that the U.S.-Japan MDT applied 
to the Senkaku Islands, Prime Minister Abe had worked to ease the Okinawa basing issue, 
connect Japan to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and alter the Japanese constitutional stance 
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on collective self-defense.188 These pro-U.S. actions by Japan may have influenced 
President Obama’s commitment to defend Japanese interests.  
Two security areas where South Korean domestic politics have affected U.S. 
foreign policy are the basing of U.S. military units on the peninsula and the stationing of 
terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) missile systems along the DMZ for defense 
purposes. The issue of U.S. troop basing came to a head in 2019 when the Trump 
administration demanded additional South Korean funding to maintain the more than 
28,000 American troops stationed around Seoul.189 The South Korean government held 
off on American demands for almost two years knowing that it holds significant sway as a 
major location of overseas American forces. Ultimately the South Koreans were able to 
make a deal with the Biden administration in 2021 to pay $1.05 billion (1.18 trillion KRW) 
to support U.S. forces, a nominal increase over the $919 million (1.03 trillion KRW) they 
offered to pay the Trump administration—which rejected the offer—for the same thing.190 
The Biden administration was sensitive to the perceived weakening of the U.S.-Korea 
alliance relationship under the Trump presidency, and Seoul was able to utilize its strategic 
position as leverage to exact a better deal. 
The issue of THAAD missile system basing in South Korea was extremely 
contentious but was able to move forward as North Korean belligerence increased which 
raised demand for better defensive capabilities. Initially, South Korean public opinion was 
strongly against THAAD basing due to fears of North Korean reprisals and the potential to 
anger Beijing, but support grew in tandem with North Korean missile inventory and 
capability.191 The shift occurred because South Koreans saw the immediate threat posed 
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by North Korean missiles and observed that THAAD functioned an expedient immediate 
response.192 Following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 2016, public support for 
THAAD reached 73.9% among South Koreans.193 It was only after the increase in public 
demand that the THAAD system was eventually deployed to South Korea by U.S. forces 
in 2017.  
In the aftermath of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident and subsequent Chinese 
island building campaign a large number of Australian politicians have become concerned 
about Chinese behavior and military capabilities.194 Australia has voiced support for 
freedom of navigation operations and been an active participant in the Quadrilateral 
security dialogue with the United States, Japan, and India. Additionally, Canberra is now 
host on a rotational basis to approximately 2,500 Marines who spend six months every year 
in the Northern Territory.195 The Marine basing in Darwin is valuable because it allows 
the United States to position rapid response forces in Southeast Asia and comes after a 
prolonged negotiation effort with the Australian government. U.S. desire to maintain this 
access means that Canberra holds some leverage with the United States. 
Singapore has maritime access to the Strait of Malacca and plays a role as a key 
trans-shipping hub which means it “is now more important to Washington as a defense 
partner and logistical host to U.S. forces than Thailand, a formal treaty ally.”196 U.S. Navy 
deployments make up “one third of all foreign warship visits into Changi Naval Base, 
which includes berthing facilities purpose-built to handle U.S. aircraft carriers, and over 
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two-thirds of all foreign warship calls into Sembawang base.”197 Singapore’s strategic 
importance was highlighted in a 2020 statement by U.S. Secretary of the Navy Kenneth 
Braithwaite that alluded to Singapore as a potential location for a reconstituted U.S. Navy 
First Fleet.198 In the future, should the U.S. decide to proceed with negotiations for such a 
move, the Singapore government would hold most of the negotiating power for such an 
arrangement. 
From 2010 to 2016, then Philippine President Benigno Aquino III faced a series of 
security challenges to include the expansion of Chinese presence in the contested Spratly 
Islands and a resurgence of Muslim extremism in Mindanao. In response to these 
challenges, President Aquino “utilized the Philippines’ traditional bilateral relationship 
with the United States as a foundation to improve cooperation with the United States to 
undertake antiterrorism actions,” and then he “secured military and security support from 
the United States when his government took an aggressive stance towards China.”199 
President Aquino was successful in aligning his interests with those of the United States 
and working to use the historical closeness between the Philippines and the United States 
to his advantage. 
In contrast, the Duterte government faced similar challenges but shirked using the 
advantages of the U.S.–Philippines relationship to his advantage. Duterte’s combative 
rhetoric and willingness to abrogate key U.S. agreements indicates that he is either not 
concerned with using the Philippines-U.S. relationship to his advantage or he is using 
belligerent behavior to hold access at arms distance from the United States. Some evidence 
indicates that Duterte may be ambivalent towards his relationship with the United States. 
The Duterte administration was angered by both the United States’ inability to halt the 
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PRC’s island building campaign, and its accusations regarding the human rights abuses of 
Philippines anti-drug efforts.200 Subsequently, the government threatened to terminate the 
VFA and shifted closer to China to increase economic development.201 However, there 
are indications that Duterte’s actions are attempts to strong-arm both support and 
recognition from the United States by threatening to shift the Philippines out of its sphere 
of influence. Because China’s rise also threatens Manila’s own foreign policy interests the 
government appears to be pursuing “a policy of leveraging its international relationships 
by seeking to regionalize the South China Sea dispute through ASEAN and by developing 
closer defense cooperation with the United States.”202 In respect to the South China Sea 
arbitration and the issue of island construction President Duterte simultaneously indicated 
interest in direct discussions with Beijing while also signaling desire for multinational 
meetings with claimant countries and the United States.203 The combination of a long 
colonial history, interpersonal civilian and military relationships, and current strategic 
necessity indicates that Manila has cards to play to help shift U.S. foreign policy positions 
in its favor. 
b. Application to Sovereignty Policy Change 
There is no clear and convincing evidence that the July 2020 policy statement by 
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, which refuted Chinese territorial claims to the South 
China Sea, is result of pressure of regional allies and partner nations. Although some Asian 
countries welcome the involvement of the United States in the South China Sea as a balance 
to Chinese encroachment, there are stronger indications which point to the opposite. Many 
countries with territorial claims to the South China Sea are at best ambivalent and at worst 
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concerned that the United States could incidentally bring open conflict between China and 
America to their doorsteps. 
Amongst ASEAN nations there has been a multitude of differing stances regarding 
U.S. involvement in the South China Sea. Countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia have 
consistently avoided picking either the side of China or the United States while some such 
as Cambodia and the Philippines have openly encouraged great power involvement.204 
According to Felix Chang, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “many 
Southeast Asian leaders see the United States as comparatively meddlesome. It often 
cajoles other countries over human rights or democracy … and sometimes attempts to foist 
American-style reforms on them.”205 The potential ramifications of involving the United 
States further into the South China Sea dilemma gives many ASEAN nations pause, 
particularly given that they would not be able to agree amongst themselves what the nature 
of such American involvement would look like. ASEAN as a regional organization also 
has no interest in bringing the South China Sea debate to the forefront of its issues. ASEAN 
has consistently avoided addressing the South China Sea territorial dispute, and even in 
June 2020 after months of belligerent Chinese actions the conflict only warranted two small 
paragraphs buried at the back end of the Chairman’s statement for the 36th ASEAN 
Summit.206 
ASEAN has also been attempting to reinvigorate its discussions with China 
regarding the COC on the South China Sea, particularly in light of China’s more recent 
belligerent activity in this disputed waterway. It is unlikely that most ASEAN countries 
openly welcomed the July 2020 statement by Secretary Pompeo because of the chances 
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that it would derail COC progress.207 Only two days after Secretary Pompeo’s statement 
the Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein called on Southeast Asian nations 
to “avoid military posturing as it is not going to help in solving the problem, and we need 
all the ASEAN countries to agree on that … and that the only way we can face off with 
China and the U.S.”208 The following month, on August 8, 2020 the ten ASEAN foreign 
ministers released a statement that addressed their concerns on the increasingly aggressive 
rhetoric by China and the United States while simultaneously calling on nations “to 
exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes 
and affect peace and stability.”209 Based on the convincing nature of Southeast Asian 
hesitation towards the involvement of the United States in the South China Sea disputes, it 
is unlikely that the 13 July 2020 policy change was the result of a demand from Asian 
countries for additional American involvement. 
c. Application to U.S.–Philippines MDT Change 
On March 1, 2019, then Secretary of State Michael Pompeo clarified that the United 
States viewed the South China Sea as a part of the Pacific and that any threat to the 
Philippines in the South China Sea would require the United States to respond.210 This 
clarification was unprecedented and came on the heels of a series of aggressive statements 
by the Philippine government that threatened U.S. interests. In the years and months 
leading up to this policy clarification there were numerous instances of pressure being 
applied by the Philippine government in an effort to ensure American commitment to 
Philippine security.  
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In December of 2018, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana ordered a 
review of the MDT in order to prove its relevance to the future of Philippine defense 
policy.211 Secretary Lorenzana declared that the review was intended to determine if the 
defense treaty was still in the Philippines’ “national interest” and stated that the document 
would be reviewed in its entirety, implying that the review would include an appraisal of 
South China Sea issues.212 This move, which effectively threatened the United States with 
the abrogation of the U.S.–Philippines MDT, appears to be part of the Philippines’ attempt 
to execute a foreign policy that is more independent from the United States. By calling for 
a review of the MDT, Secretary Lorenzana applied direct pressure to the U.S. in a move 
apparently aimed at making the United States clarify the scope of the MDT. Manila’s signal 
to end the MDT posed significant risk to U.S. access to the Philippines because the MDT 
undergirds the legitimacy of the EDCA and VFA. Effectively, the United States would 
have lost all access to a key ally that is critically positioned in the South China Sea. Since 
only three months later the United States clarified the scope of the MDT in a way that it 
had avoided for over sixty years it appears that the Philippines influence campaign worked. 
It is in the national interest of the Philippine government to depict its alliance with 
the United States as applying to the South China Sea disputes. The Philippines and its 
island territories are on the frontline of Chinese maritime activities in the South China Sea 
where they have been exposed to “gray zone” tactics, or tactics that “skirt the definition of 
war to avoid prompting a kinetic response.”213 Accordingly, there have been Philippine 
government officials who have publicly declared that America must defend the 
Philippines’ territory and citizens should a dispute erupt over the South China Sea.214 In 
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May of 2014, Philippines congressional representative Walden Bello claimed that it was 
absolutely necessary for the United States to clarify that the Philippines’ South China Sea 
claims were explicitly protected under the U.S.–Philippines MDT in a similar fashion to 
how the Senkaku Islands were declared to apply to the U.S.-Japan defense treaty under the 
Obama administration.215 The Philippines has a clear motivation for its own security 
interests, and incentives that it can dangle in front of Washington in the form of the MDT, 
EDCA, and VFA. It is therefore highly likely that the unpredictable nature of U.S.-
Philippine politics helped to influence the U.S. clarification of its MDT. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this chapter was to evaluate the potential role that allies and partner 
countries may play in shaping U.S. policy changes with respect to two key South China 
Sea issues. Philippine influence efforts adequately explain why the Trump administration 
chose to clarify the applicability of its U.S.–Philippines MDT. The government in Manila 
was able to exploit its role as a strategically important part of American policy in Southeast 
Asia in order to gain firmer U.S. security commitments towards the defense of Philippine 
interests in the South China Sea. 
However, the sovereignty policy shift remains best explained by the balance of 
power shift and Chinese belligerence discussed in Chapter III. There is not sufficient 
evidence to show that either a demand or an influence campaign on the part of U.S. allies 
and partners drove the U.S. policy change regarding the South China Sea sovereignty issue. 
There are too many conflicting policy interests between the varying claimant nations to 
desire involvement from another major global power. Furthermore, since the originally 
neutral U.S. policy served to mitigate appearing partial to one claimant over another, it is 
unlikely that the United States would allow itself to be unduly influenced by a particular 
country on this issue. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In both 2019 and 2020, the United States made clear breaks with previous policy 
stances regarding South China Sea sovereignty and the U.S.–Philippines MDT. This thesis 
has traced the development of these policy changes and attempted answer why these two 
policy changes occurred. I propose and examine two explanations for these changes: First, 
the United States was reacting to China – either as part of a balance of power shift or as a 
result of specific Chinese actions, and second, that the United States reacted to pressure 
from allies and partner countries. 
The United States’ decision to update its policies was prompted by a combination 
of the shifting balance of power, Chinese actions, and the influence of regional allies. The 
shifting balance-of-power provides an overarching reason for why the United States 
changed both policies. As China continues to grow economically, diplomatically, and 
militarily, the United States has to position itself as best it can to maintain its own 
hegemonic influence in Asia. The reaction to specific Chinese activity best explains the 
timing and rationale behind the 2020 sovereignty policy shift, given the encroaching nature 
of Chinese actions in the South China Sea at the height of the coronavirus pandemic. The 
influence of allies and partners explanation best describes the timing and rationale behind 
the U.S.-Philippine MDT policy given the tumultuous relationship yet strategic need that 
the United States has with the Philippines.  
The remainder of this chapter will summarize my findings, discuss the positions of 
the new Biden administration on these policy areas, and discuss potential implications for 
the future of U.S. policy in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In Chapter III, I tested the first hypothesis: that the United States’ actions were 
either a reaction to a broader balance-of-power shift or a reaction to specific belligerent 
activities by the PRC. Evidence indicates that the United States has altered its Asia policy 
platforms in response to a shifting economic, military, and diplomatic balance-of-power in 
favor of China. Prior to these policy changes, the United States started a trade war with 
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China, initiated new defense development projects, and strengthened its bilateral 
relationships through new security arrangements such as the Philippine EDCA and the 
Quad security dialogue with Japan, Australia, and India. The change in the sovereignty 
policy is part of a broader reaction to the balance-of-power shift. The new policy pitted 
against China is aimed to strike a diplomatic blow to the PRC, endear the United States to 
its Asian allies, and assert U.S. regional influence. In a similar fashion, the language, 
timing, and events surrounding the U.S.–Philippines MDT policy change also appears to 
be a reaction to a balance-of-power shift. U.S. officials refer to the benefits of partnership 
with the United States as opposed to partnership with China and seek to reassure the 
Philippines of U.S. commitment to their defense, at a time when the Philippine archipelago 
has increased rapidly in strategic importance. 
I also investigated whether or not specific instances of Chinese belligerent activity 
could have instigated these policy changes. There has been a long history of provocative 
interactions between Chinese forces and the various civilian and military fleets of their 
neighboring countries in the South China Sea. In addition to military ship-to-ship 
confrontations, land reclamation campaigns, and standoffs with civilian fishing fleets, the 
Chinese instigated six months-worth of provocative actions in the beginning of 2020. These 
activities included aggressiveness by Chinese military vessels, the sinking of a Vietnamese 
boat by PAFMM forces, the creation of new research stations, and the establishment of 
new administrative zones in the South China Sea. The U.S. territorial sovereignty policy 
change coincided with a series of U.S. military shows-of-force to include aircraft and ship 
deployments to the South China Sea in response to Chinese actions.  
In Chapter IV, I examined the second explanation: that the United States’ policy 
changes were driven by the influence of ally and partner nations in Asia. There is historical 
evidence which supports U.S. policy as being responsive to the external influence of allies 
and partners. U.S. military force adjustments in Okinawa, the willingness of the U.S. to 
protect Japanese interests in the Senkaku Islands, funding negotiations for U.S. troops 
based in South Korea, negotiations to forward deploy troops to Australia, and overtures to 
expand presence in and around Singapore show that Asian nations hold sway over the 
direction of U.S. policy actions. Philippine government officials threatening the abrogation 
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of U.S. access to key installations and politicians calling on the United States to clarify its 
security commitments put significant pressure on the United States to act. The resulting 
policy change adds to the evidence that U.S. policy is influenced through its bilateral 
relationships.  
My overall findings are as follows. I find that the shifting balance-of-power 
explanation adequately addresses why the United States changed its policies regarding 
sovereignty disputes and the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. China has 
significantly expanded its interests in Asia at the expense of the United States and has done 
so through a combination of economic, military, and diplomatic activity. The United States 
lost diplomatic ground among Southeast Asian countries following weak responses to 
Chinese island building and military infrastructure development. This was compounded by 
the significant regional economic power held by the PRC and increasing Chinese 
diplomatic influence in countries that previously placed great value their relationships with 
the United States. By changing stance on these two policy areas the United States gave 
unambiguous support to the Philippines and smaller Southeast Asian countries facing a 
dominating Chinese presence in the South China Sea.  
I also find, in addition to the balance-of-power explanation, the 2020 sovereignty 
policy shift closely follows with multiple instances of Chinese belligerence. The Chinese 
government renewed provocative activity in the South China Sea in the beginning of 2020 
during the height of the coronavirus panic and these actions appeared as an attempt to 
further the PRC’s South China Sea foothold while the rest of the international community 
was distracted. The large number of hostile interactions with neighboring fishing fleets and 
navies, combined with the attempt to codify control over their occupied features, was 
reacted to with a significant show of U.S. military force. The Chinese provocations also 
spurred the United States into declaring its direct opposition to Chinese territorial claims 
as the United States did not want a repeat of the failed Scarborough Shoal mediation in 
2012. 
However, with respect to the U.S. policy change on the MDT, there is inadequate 
evidence to show that specific Chinese actions also drove this shift. In the lead-up to the 
2019 statement by Secretary Pompeo, there is an absence of similar Chinese activity that 
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can be directly linked to an American response. Notably, three months prior to the policy 
shift, the Philippines Defense Secretary made a point to publicly call for a complete review 
of the U.S.–Philippines MDT and indicated that an unsatisfactory conclusion to such a 
review would result in the termination of the treaty. As a result of further investigation, I 
find that the 2019 U.S.–Philippines MDT policy change was driven by a combination of 
the balance-of-power shift and the influence of ally and partner countries. The call to 
review the MDT put significant pressure on the United States to clarify its defense 
commitments to the Philippines. The United States was put in the position of losing key 
access to Philippines military facilities for forward deployed forces and it acted to maintain 
that access and bolster the U.S.–Philippines defense relationship. 
Both of these explanations play a role in answering why the United States changed 
its policies. The United States has generally acted to revert the changing balance-of-power 
while simultaneously catering the timing of its changes based on provocative actions of 
China and the influence of allies and partners. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
In the first five months of the Biden administration, the PRC has continued to 
instigate provocations short of open conflict in the South China Sea. For a period of several 
months hundreds of Peoples’ Armed Forces Maritime Militia fishing vessels staged 
themselves at anchor inside and around Whitsun Reef, a maritime feature located well 
inside the Philippines’ claimed exclusive economic zone.216 At the height of the crisis in 
February and March 2021 the Philippine Coast Guard documented over 200 Chinese 
vessels surrounding the reef.217  
The Biden Administration has twice reaffirmed the policy changes regarding 
sovereignty and the U.S.–Philippines MDT. The first time was during a phone call between 
Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro 
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Locsin in January 2021, when Secretary Blinken “underscored that the United States rejects 
China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea,” and “pledged to stand with Southeast 
Asian claimants in the face of PRC pressure.”218 The second reaffirmation occurred on 
April 8, 2021, when Secretary Blinken confirmed “the applicability of the 1951 U.S.-
Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty to the South China Sea.”219 
With both of these policy changes the United States has positioned itself against 
Chinese interests in the South China Sea and committed itself to defending the Philippines 
as a part of its treaty alliance. These are significant changes to historical policy and could 
imply that a new set of red lines exists which could trigger open conflict between PRC and 
U.S. forces. If the Chinese were to attack the Philippine Coast Guard or China were to try 
to take the reef by force, then according to the new U.S. policy position the United States 
might be called into the conflict. The fear of a larger war sparked by missteps of an allied 
country could be realized if the Philippines were to instigate such a crisis. 
The United States has also incurred additional risk to its international stature should 
it come up short in its new stance on the sovereignty issue or fail to defend the Philippines 
in the South China Sea. Were this to happen, the United States would risk appearing 
uninterested and unreliable as an alliance partner. Failure to adhere to these new principles 
could be highly detrimental to the already precarious opinion of the United States among 
Asian countries and it might embolden the PRC to push the limits of influence and 
territorial expansion.  
In light of these policy changes the United States will undoubtedly face a China 
that is increasingly convinced that U.S. actions are aimed to contain China’s economic, 
diplomatic, and military supremacy in Asia. The Whitsun Reef crisis may indicate that 
China is willing to continue provocations below the level of war and could cause unrest in 
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the South China Sea but stop short of actions which trigger an international response. This 
is dangerous ground, because actions in this maritime grey zone can undermine a U.S. 
South China Sea policy primarily designed to confront direct threats to sovereignty and 
security. 
The United States Navy must be prepared to act as the spear tip for these policies 
in times of conflict and remain the balancing force for free use of the seas in peacetime. 
Navy leaders should also be cognizant of the potential for escalation if it chooses to act as 
this spear considering that it does not have easy access to respond rapidly given its lack of 
forward operating bases inside the South China Sea. Naval forces should be prepared for 
decisive action in addition to FONOPS and routine patrols because it will take 
proactiveness to prevent the future occupation of maritime features. Not only should the 
United States Navy continue to patrol these waters, but with U.S. and Philippine Coast 
Guard assistance it should protect the lawful territorial rights of aggrieved nations in the 
South China Sea. 
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